
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Cover program reads: Phase I Inspection Report, National Dam Inspection Program; however, the official title of the program is: National Program for Inspection of Non-Federal Dams; use cover date for date of report.

13. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

DAMS, INSPECTION, DAM SAFETY, Pond, Union

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

The dam is a concrete gravity structure with the spillway constructed in an "L" shape. The total length of the dam is approximately 590 ft. including the earth dike. The top of the dam is approximately 33 ft. above the bed of the Hockanum River. The spillway is a broad crested compound weir of trapesoidal cross-section consisting of an outer concrete shell over an inner earth and rubble core. In 1972 No. 8 reinforcing bars grouted into 2 inch diameter holes 20 ft. long and spaced at 10 ft. intervals were installed through the top of the old dam, probably in an attempt to stabilize the upper portion of the present dam.

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
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UPLE ONNECTICUT RIVER BASIN MANCHESTER , CONNECTICUT

UNION POND DAM CT 00013

PHASE I INSPECTION REPORT
NATIONAL DAM INSPECTION PROGRAM





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
NEW ENGLAND DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS
WALTHAM, MASS. 02154

FEBRUARY 1979

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NEW ENGLAND DIVISION () A QF ENGINEERS $424 \ TRAPPILQ \in \text{DAD}$

WALTHAM, MASSACHUTETTS 02154

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:

NEDED-E

SEP 1 0 1379

Honorable Ella T. Grasso Governor of the State of Connecticut State Capitol Hartford, Connecticut 06115

Dear Governor Grasso:

Inclosed is a copy of the Union Pond Dam Phase I Inspection Report, which was prepared under the National Program for Inspection of Non-Federal Dams. The report is based upon a visual inspection, a review of past performance, and a preliminary hydrological analysis. A brief assessment is included at the beginning of the report.

The visual inspection conducted at the site has revealed that the contrete in the downstream face of the spillway has suffered serious deterioration. Due to this, the stability of the structure appears to be marginal based upon existing data. In addition, the preliminary hydrologic analysis has indicated that the spillway capacity for the Union Pond Dam would likely be exceeded by floods greater than twenty-eight percent of one-half the Probable Maximum Flood (1/2 PMF), the test flood for spillway adequacy. Our screening criteria specifies that a dam of this class which does not have sufficient spillway capacity to discharge fifty percent of the PMF, should be adjudged as having a seriously inadequate spillway. As a result of the concerns of the stability of the dam in conjunction with the serious inadequacy of the spillway, the dam has been assessed as unsafe until corrective measures are completed.

It is recognized that the owner has engaged the services of a professional consulting engineer to investigate the deficiencies of the dam, including those previously mentioned, as recommended in the draft report previously forwarded to Commissioner Pac's office. It is recommended that based upon this investigation appropriate remedial mitigating measures should be designed and completed within 12 months of this date of notification. In the interim a detailed emergency operation plan and warning system should be promptly developed. During periods of unusually heavy precipitation, round-the-clock surveillance should be provided.



NEDED-E Honorable Ella T. Grasso

I have approved the report and support the findings and recommendations described in Section 7, with qualifications as noted above. I request that you keep me informed of the actions taken to implement these recommendations since this follow-up is an important part of the non-Federal Dam Inspection Program.

A copy of this report has been forwarded to the Department of Environmental Protection, the cooperating agency for the State of Connecticut. This report has also been furnished to the owner of the project, the Town of Manchester, 41 Center Stret, Manchester, Connecticut 06040, ATTN: Mr. Jay Giles, Public Works Director.

Copies of this report will be made available to the public, upon request to this office, under the Freedom of Information Act, thirty days from the date of this letter.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank you and the Department of Environmental Protection for the cooperation extended in carrying out this program.

Sincerely,

MAX B. SCHEIDER

Colonel, Corps of Engineers

Division Engineer

UPPER CONNECTICUT RIVER BASIN MANCHESTER , CONNECTICUT

UNION POND DAM CT 00013

PHASE I INSPECTION REPORT
NATIONAL DAM INSPECTION PROGRAM



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

NEW ENGLAND DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS

WALTHAM, MASS. 02154

FEBRUARY 1979

BRIEF ASSESSED

PHASE I INSPECTION REPORT

NATIONAL PROGRAM OF INSPECTION OF DAMS

Name of Dam:	UNION POND DAM
Inventory Number:	CT 00013
State Located:	CONNECTICUT
County Located:	HARTFORD
Town Located:	MANCHESTER
Stream:	HOCKANUM
Owner:	TOWN OF MANCHESTER
Date of Inspection:	NOVEMBER 27, 1978
Inspection Team:	PETER HEYNEN
	CALVIN GOLDSMITH
	GONZALO CASTRO

The dam is a concrete gravity structure with the spillway constructed in an "L" shape. The total length of the dam is approximately 590 feet including the earth dike. The top of the dam is approximately 33 feet above the bed of The spillway is a broad crested the Hockanum River. compound weir of trapezoidal cross-section consisting of an outer concrete shell over an inner earth and rubble core. In 1972 No. 8 reinforcing bars grouted into 2 inch diameter holes 20 feet long and spaced at 10 foot intervals were installed through the top of the old dam, probably in an attempt to stabilize the upper portion of the present dam. The spillway crest is four feet below the top of the dam abutments. There are four outlets from the dam. A 42 inch low level outlet is at the right end of the spillway which is referred to on the existing 1901 plan as the "old waste gate". At the extreme left end of the spillway, there are two 2'x3' intermediate level sluice gates through the dam. The left gate is operational while the right floor stand is disconnected from the gate and hence will not function.

The fourth outlet is in the gatehouse at the extreme left end of the dam between the left dam abutment and the earth dike. The outlet feeds a cast iron conduit nine feet in diameter. The conduit runs under the road and flows back into the river further downstream. The gate to the conduit is presently inoperable. To the left of the gatehouse is the earth dike, which is approximately 175 feet long and has an average crest elevation of 146.7.

Based upon the visual inspection and its past performance, the dam appears to be in poor condition. The stability of the structure appears to be marginal based on existing data, and the downstream concrete facing of the spillway is heavily deteriorated. The condition of the dike appears good, however the gatehouse adjacent to the dike and dam, is partially demolished. The condition of the 9 foot conduit and the gate controlling it are questionable and warrant attention. There are other minor areas requiring attention as well.

Based upon the size (Small) and hazard classification (High) of the dam in accordance with Corps of Engineers Guidelines, the Test Flood will be equivalent to one-half the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). Peak inflow to the pond is 31,000 cfs; peak outflow (Test Flood) is 30,500 cfs with the dam overtopped 3.9 feet. Based upon our hydraulics computations, the spillway capacity is 8400 cubic feet per second (cfs), which is equivalent to 28% of the Test Flood.

It is recommended that further studies be undertaken to perform a more refined hydraulic/hydrologic study to determine the best way to increase the ability of the spill-way to pass a greater percentage of the Test Flood, and to increase the overall discharge capacity of the facility, including the gates.

A registered professional engineer qualified in dam engineering should immediately investigate the stability of the dam, and develop recommendations to adequately increase the dam stability and eliminate seepage through the dam.


The condition of the 9 foot diameter conduit should be investigated and consideration given to renovating and maintaining it as another low level outlet to be used in times of high water. Should the owner decide to seal off the conduit, it should be done permanently, and as close to the gate as possible.

A repair scheme to renovate the downstream concrete surfacing should be included in the recommendations. Other areas requiring attention include the damaged gatehouse, the inoperable right sluice gate, trees growing on the earth dike, and the contact seeps at the right abutment. An operations and maintenance plan should be instituted as well.

The recommendations discussed above and in Section 7, should be instituted immediately upon the owner's receipt of this report, while the remedial measures, also in Section 7, should be instituted within one year of the owner's receipt of this report.

OF COUNTY OF COU

Peter M. Heynen, P.E. Project Manager Cahn Engineers, Inc.



Edgar B. Vinal, Jr., P.E Senior Vice President Cahn Engineers, Inc. This Phase I Inspection Report on Union Fond Dam has been reviewed by the undersigned Review Board members. In our opinion, the reported findings, conclusions, and recommendations are consistent with the Recommended Guidelines for Safety Inspection of Dams, and with good engineering judgment and practice, and is hereby submitted for approval.

Joseph J. Mc Elroy

JOSEPH A. MCELROY, MEMBER Foundation & Materials Branch . Engineering Division

CARNEY M. TERZIAN, MEMBER

Design Branch

Engineering Division

Joseph W. Finegan, Jr., CHIRLAN

JOSEPH V FINEGAN, JR., CHAIRLAN Chief, Reservoir Control Center

Rater Control Branch Engineering Division

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

JOE B. FRYAR

Chief, Engineering Division

PREFACE

This report is prepared under guidance contained in the Recommended Guidelines for Safety Inspection of Dams, for Phase I Investigations. Copies of these guidelines may be obtained from the Office of Chief of Engineers, Washington, D.C. 20314. The purpose of a Phase I Investigation is to identify expeditiously those dams which may pose hazards to human life or property. The assessment of the general condition of the dam is based upon available data and visual inspection. Detailed investigation, and analyses involving topographic mapping, subsurface investigations, testing, and detailed computational evaluations are beyond the scope of a Phase I Investigation; however, the investigation is intended to identify any need for such studies.

In reviewing this report, it should be realized the reported condition of the dam is based on observath is of field conditions at the time of inspection along wind data available to the inspection team. In cases where the reservoir was lowered or drained prior to inspection such action, while improving the stability and safety of the am, removes the normal load on the structure and may coure certain conditions which might otherwise be detectable if inspected under the normal operating environment of the structure.

It is important to note that the condition of a dam depends on numerous and constantly changing internal and external conditions, and is evolutionary in nature. It would be incorrect to assume that the present condition of the dam would necessarily represent the condition of the dam at some point in the future. Only through continued care and inspection can there be any chance that unsafe conditions will be detected.

Phase I inspections are not intended to provide detailed hydrologic and hydraulic analyses. In accordance with the established Guidelines, the Spillway Test Flood is based on the estimated "Probable Maximum Flood" for the region (greatest reasonably possible storm runoff), or fractions there of. Because of the magnitude and rarity of such a storm event, a finding that a spillway will not pass the test flood should not be interpreted as neccessarily posing a highly inadequate condition. The test flood provides a measure of relative spillway capacity and serves as an aid in determining the need for more detailed hydrologic and hydraulic studies, considering the size of the dam, its general condition and the downstream damage potential.

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
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
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NON-FED DAMS INSPECTION OF CAMN ENGINEERS INC WALLINGFORD, COM





PHASE I INSPECTION REPORT

UNION POND DAM

SECTION I

PROJECT INFORMATION

1.1 GENERAL

- a. Authority Public Law 92-367, August 8, 1972, authorized the Secretary of the Army, through the Corps of Engineers, to initiate a National Program of Dam Inspection throughout the United States. The New England Division of the Corps of Engineers has been assigned the responsibility of supervising the inspection of dams within the New England Region. Cahn Engineers, Inc. has been retained by the New England Division to inspect and report on selected dams in the State of Connecticut. Authorization and notice to proceed were issued to Cahn Engineers, Inc. under a letter of November 28, 1978 from Max B. Scheider, Colonel, Corps of Engineers. Contract No. DACW 33-79-C-0014 has been assigned by the Corps of Engineers for this work.
- b. Purpose of Inspection Program The purposes of the program are to:
 - (1) Perform technical inspection and evaluation of nonfederal dams to identify conditions requiring correction in a timely manner by non-federal interests.
 - (2) Encourage and prepare the States to quickly initiate effective dam inspection programs for non-federal dams.
 - (3) To update, verify and complete the National Inventory of Dams.
- c. Scope of Inspection Program The scope of this Phase I inspection report includes:
 - (1) Gathering, reviewing and presenting all available data as can be obtained from the owners, previous owners, the state and other associated parties.
 - (2) A field inspection of the facility detailing the visual condition of the dam, embankments and appurtenant structures.

- (3) Computations concerning the hydrolics and hydrology of the facility and its relationship to the calculated flood through the existing spillway.
- (4) An assessment of the condition of the facility and corrective measures required.

It should be noted that this report does not pass judgement on the safety or stability of the dam other than on a visual basis. The inspection is to identify those features on the dam which need corrective action and/or further study.

1.2 Description of Project

a. Description of Dam and Appurtenances - The dam is a concrete gravity structure in an "L" shape. The total length of the dam is approximately 590 feet including the earth dike, with the left and right portions of the spillway being approximately 194 and 104 feet long, respectively. The top of the dam is approximately 33 feet above the bed of the Hockanum River. The spillway is a broad crested compound weir of trapezoidal cross section consisting of an outer concrete shell over an inner earth and rubble core. The existing dam was built over the original dam which was founded on a bedrock ridge. In 1972, No. 8 reinforcing bars 10 feet on center were grouted into 2 inch diameter holes drilled through the top of the present dam down 20 feet into the original dam. This was probably an attempt to increase the stability of the upper portion of the present dam.

The spillway crest is four feet below the top of the dam abutments. There are four outlets from the dam. There is a 42 inch low level outlet (invert elevation approximately 117.7) at the right end of the spillway, which is referred to on the existing 1901 plan as the "old waste gate". This gate, termed a "mud gate" by the owner, was opened by use of jacks when the pond was lowered for repairs in 1972. At the extreme left end of the spillway, there are two intermediate level sluice gates through the dam, both of which outlet at approximate elevation 130.1. The left gate is operational while the right floor stand to the gate will not function. The outlets are approximately 2 feet by 3 feet in size.

The fourth outlet is in the gatehouse at the extreme left end of the dam between the left dam abutment and the earth dike. The outlet feeds a cast iron conduit nine feet in diameter with an invert elevation of 127.5. The conduit runs under Union Street and flows back into the river further downstream. The gate to the conduit is presently inoperable, although the machinery is in good condition.

To the left of the gatehouse is the earth dike, which is approximately 175 feet long and has an average crest elevation of 146.7. A 6 inch thick wooden core wall consisting of three 2 inch planks was constructed along the centerline of the dike for a length unspecified on the existing plan.

- b. Location The dam is located on the Hockanum River in a suburban area of the town of Manchester, County of Hartford, State of Connecticut. The dam is shown on the Manchester USGS Quadrangle Map having coordinates latitude N41 $^{\circ}$ 48.0 and longitude W72 $^{\circ}$ 31.7 .
- c. Size Classification SMALL The dam impounds 720 acre-feet of water (See Appendix Section D-7) with the pond level at the top of the dam, which at elevation 146.7, is approximately 33 feet above the level of the old streambed. According to the Recommended Guidelines, a dam with a height of less than 40 feet and a storage capacity of less than 1000 acre-feet is classified as small.
- d. <u>Hazard Classification</u> HIGH Residential structures a minimum of 4 to 6 feet above the water level in the Hockanum River are located downstream of the dam. The closest structures are a house and garage approximately 8000 feet downstream near North Adams Street in Manchester. Also in this area are 12 commercial buildings, 5 residential structures and an apartment complex just downstream of North Adams Street.
 - e. Ownership Town of Manchester
 41 Center Street
 Manchester, Connecticut
 Mr. Jay Giles, Public Works Director
 (203) 647-3142

f. Operator - None

- g. <u>Purpose of Dam</u> The dam was owned previously by the Cheney Brothers and the Connecticut Power Company. Present ownership by the Town of Manchester limits usage to recreational activities.
- h. Design and Construction History The following information is believed to be accurate based on the plans and correspondence available.

One of Connecticut's first paper mills was constructed on this site, but burned down in 1778, according to a sesquicentennial plaque on the side of the gatehouse dated 1823 to 1973. The date of the construction of the original dam is unknown. The dam was raised to its present height, and the gatehouse and 9 foot diameter conduit added in 1901 for the Cheney Brothers who owned it at that time. In 1972 repairs to the dam were carried out as described in

detail in the correspondence in Appendix Section B. Loose or deteriorated concrete on both upstream and downstream faces of the dam was jackhammered and removed. Voids in the dam which were discovered were filled by pressure grouting. Facing of the dam was done with wire mesh and gunite. Holes were drilled 20 feet deep from the top down into the lower portion of the present dam and into the old dam. Number 8 reinforcing bars were inserted and grouted, or pressure grouted if voids were discovered. Upon conducting the above work, it was discovered that the core of the dam was actually an earth and rubble core, rather than a solid concrete core. Subsequently, it was decided to seal the upstream face of the dam by excavating the fill adjacent to the dam and placing 3 inches of gunite over the face. Where this was not feasible, a clay blanket was placed adjacent to the dam extending away from the face up to 52 feet into the pond. Additional reinforcing of the dowsntream face was also recommended, as well as the installation of drilled weepholes near the downstream toe of the dam to provide pressure relief within the dam core. In addition, the controlled sluice gates were built and installed during these repairs to the dam.

Engineering for the above work was performed in part by Clarence Welti Associates, Inc., Macchi & Hoffman Engineers, Mr. Walter Senkow, Town Engineer of Manchester and Mr. William H.O'Brien III of the State Water Resources Commission.

i. Normal Operational Procedures - The single operational intermediate level sluice gate is opened in times of high water, or to control pollution from upstream sources, or when new construction requires the water level to be lowered. This was the case during our initial inspection when the water level was lowered for sewer and storm drain construction projects. When the pond was drained for the 1972 dam repairs, it was necessary to open the low level waste gate at the right end of the dam by means of special jacking equipment. To our knowledge, it has not been opened since that time.

1.3 Pertinent Data

- a. <u>Drainage Area</u> 53.9 square miles of rolling terrain. A large part of the drainage area is rural with scattered residential developments. A portion of the drainage area is made up of more heavily developed areas including Vernon and Rockville.
- b. <u>Discharge at Dam Site</u> Discharge from the pond is from 2 intermediate level sluices, a low level waste gate, and an inoperable 9 foot diameter conduit.

Outlet Works: 2 sluices-2'x3' @ el. 132 (approx.) l waste gate-42 inch dia. 0 el. 117.7 9 foot dia. conduit @ el. 127.5 Maximum known flood at damsite: 21 inches over spillway Ungated spillway capacity @ top of dam: 8400 cfs @ el. 146.7 Ungated spillway capacity @ test flood el.: 8400 cfs Gated spillway capacity @ normal pool el.: N/A Gated spillway capacity @ test flood el.: N/A Total spillway capacity @ test flood el.: 8400 cfs Total project discharge @ test flood el.: N/A Elevations - (Ft. above Mean Sea Level, U.S.G.S. Datum) Streambed @ centerline of dam: 114 (approx.) Maximum Tailwater: N/A Upstream inlet to 9 ft. conduit: 127.5 Normal pool: 142.7 Full flood control pool: 146.7 142.7 Spillway crest: Design surcharge (Original Design): N/A 146.7 Top of Dam:

150.6+

Test flood design

surcharge:

d. Reservoir

Length of Max. pool: 3300+ ft.

Length of normal pool: 3300 ft. (approx).

Length of flood

control pool: N/A

e. Storage (See Appendix Section D-7)

Normal pool: 515 ac.-ft.

Flood control pool: N/A

Spillway crest pool: 515 ac.-ft.

Top of dam: 720 ac.-ft.

Test flood pool: N/A

f. Reservoir Surface

Top dam: \$1.5+acres

Test flood pool: N/A

Flood-control pool: N/A

Normal pool 51.5 acres

Spillway crest 51.5 acres

g. Dam

Type: Concrete gravity structure

and earth dike

Length: 590 ft. (estimated from

plans)

Height: 33 ft.

Top Width: 6 ft.

Side Slopes: Dam - vertical upstream

face

Dike - 1.5H to 1V both

slopes

Zoning:

N/A

Impervious Core:

N/A

Cutoff:

Ledge rock

Grout curtain:

N/A

Other:

Rubble interior of

spillway

Diversion and Regulating Tunnel

Type:

Iron conduit, invert @

el. 127,5

Length:

370 ft. + to outlet

downstream

Closure:

N/A

Access:

Conduit buried in old

canal

Regulating Facilities:

3 gates in gatehouse-

inoperable

Spillway

Type:

Broad crested concrete

weir of trapezoidal

cross-section

Length of weir:

194 ft. (left section)

104 ft. (right section)

Crest el.:

142.7

Gates:

None

U/S Channel:

Clay blanket on shallow

slope up to 50' into

reservoir

D/S Channel:

Rock ledge and sand and

gravel river bottom

General:

None

j. Regulating Outlets

Invert & Size:

2-2'x3' sluices @ el.

132 (approx.)

1-42 inch dia. sluice @ el. 117.7

Description:

Sluices

Control Mechanism:

Intermediate sluices by 2 floor stands 42 inch by hand or jack operated mechanism

Other:

1 sluice gate inoperable

SECTION 2: ENGINEERING DATA

2.1 Design

- a. Available Data The available data consists of drawings, correspondence, calculations, and specifications by the owner, Clarence Welti Associates, Inc., Macchi and Hoffman Engineers, the State Water Resources Commission, and A.C. Rice, Engineer.
- b. Design Features With the exception of the 1901 plan, the existing data indicates the design features stated previously herein. The 1901 plan did not state that the core of the dam was rubble, or that the concrete spillway was actually only concrete facing.
- c. Design Data There ware no engineering values, assumptions, test results or calculations available for the original construction or the 1901 raising of the dam.

2.2 Construction

- a. Available Data There were no as-built plans or construction records available, with the exception of those pertaining to the 1972 repairs of the dam.
- b. <u>Construction Considerations</u> No information is available.

2.3 Operations

No formal operations records or data are known to exist.

2.4 Evaluation

- a. Availability Existing data was provided by the State Water Resources Commission. The owner made the dam accessible for visual inspection.
- b. Adequacy The limited amount of engineering data was adequate to perform only a very general stability analysis utilizing conservative assumptions. The actual condition and composition of the core of the dam are uncertain. The final assessment of this dam must be based primarily on visual inspection, past performance history, and hydraulic computations of spillway capacity based on approximate hydrologic judgement.
- c. <u>Validity</u> A comparison of record data and visual observations reveals no observable significant discrepencies in the record data.

3.1 Findings

- a. General The general condition of the dam is poor. Inspection revealed areas requiring repair and maintenance, as well as some areas requiring further investigation.
- b. Dam The reservoir level was 13 2 feet below the top of the dam, at approximately elevation 133.5 on November 27, 1979 during our initial inspection. Upon subsequent inspections by Calvin Goldsmith on January 17, 22, and 26, 1979, the water level was approximately 0.5,6, and 8 inches over the spillway crest, respectively.

Crest - The crest of the dam is concrete with a gunite covering. The gunite was in good condition with minimal cracking. There are pipes at regular intervals along the crest of the spillway which, if struck by debris during heavy outflow, could contribute to localized instability of the top portion of the crest. It is this top portion of the crest that is of questonable stability already, as discussed in Section 6.

Upstream Face - The vertical upstream face exposed above the clay blanket is covered with gunite, which is in good condition with little or no cracking and only slight spalling.

Downstream Face - The downstream face of the dam is exposed down to the rock foundation. The dam shows considerable efflorescence and spalling as shown in Photos 1,3, and 4. Some cracks appear to be at least 2 to 3 feet deep. Seepage was observed through cracks in the dam, through the concrete-rock interface, through the exposed bedrock immediately downstream of the dam, and from weep holes near the toe of the spillway. At the time of the inspection, discharge from the seeps was small, however as the water level in the pond is raised, it is likely the amount of seepage will increase. (See Photos 4 and 6). The bedrock exposures are arkose sandstone with near-horizontal bedding.

The earth dike to the left of the gatehouse is in good condition. Both upstream and downstream slopes are grass-covered with evidence of minor erosion and sloughing only on the upstream face. There are trees growing on the dike adjacent to the gatehouse.

c. Appurtenant Structures - The gatehouse at the left end of the dam is in very poor condition. The wall of the gatehouse facing the dam has been demolished, exposing the inoperative gate mechanism of the 9 foot diameter conduit. The exposed portion of the trash racks to the conduit are badly bent and corroded. The concrete retaining wall to the left of the gate house has a large crack running diagonally from the upper right corner down towards the lower corner. The upper portion of the wall is displaced in an upstream direction a maximum of approximately 4 inches.

Immediately to the right of the gatehouse there are two intermediate outlets through the left dam abutment. The gate valves located on the upstream face of the dam are opened by manually operated mechanisms on top of the abutment. The left gate is operational while the right gate is separated from the floor stand and hence, cannot be opened. See Photo 8. The downstream buttresses adjacent to the outlets are spalled and exhibit significant efflorscence.

The low level waste gate is located at the extreme right end of the dam. A one inch wire mesh screen protects the upstream inlet from trash entering. The wire fencing at each abutment designed to limit access to the dam crest, has been vandalized and no longer serves its purpose.

- d. Reservoir Area The shoreline surrounding the pond is partially wooded and generally developed with single family residences.
- e. $\frac{\text{Downstream Channel}}{\text{undeveloped, steep-sided}}$ and wooded down to the initial impact area.

3.2 Evaluation

Based on our visual inspection, it was possible to assess the dam as being generally in poor condition. The following features were identified which could affect the future condition and/or stability of the dam.

- 1. The cracking and spalling of the downstream face of the dam could lead to a weakening of the dam and a decrease in resistance to sliding and/or overturning.
- 2. The seeps observed through the cracks in the dam and through its contacts with the foundation bedrock tend to accelerate deterioration of the dam when water freezes and expands in the cracks. This probably accounts for the relatively rapid deterioration of the downstream face of the dam since its repair in 1972.

- 3. The elevation of the crest of the dike near the warm ner of the fence surrounding the gatehouse is 0.5 to 3 continuer than the top of the dam. Should the dam ever be overtopped, a concentrated flow would result in this area which would severely erode the dike.
- 4. The roots of the trees at the right end of the dike near the gatehouse could provide seepage paths which, especially in times of high water, could lead to deterioration of the earth dike by erosion.

SECTION 4: OPERATIONAL PRO-

4.1 Regulating Procedures

The single operable sluice gate is now to control flow and lower water levels in the pond where pollution from upstream sources becomes abnormally severe. The water level has also been lowered recently to facilitate the construction of sewer and storm drain projects in the area of the pond. Daily lake level readings are not taken.

4.2 Maintenance of Dam

As was described previously in Section 1.2 G, "Design and Construction History," repairs to the dam and gate structures were last performed on a major scale in 1972. Only minor maintenance to gates and fencing has been performed since then on an as-needed basis.

4.3 Maintenance of Operating Facilities

The only maintenance performed to the operating facilities is the removal of logs or other debris from the sluice gates, and the repair of the gate mechanisms as needed.

4.4 Description of Any Formal Warning System In Effect

No formal warning system is in effect. The dam is checked periodically for problems during storms or times of very high water.

4.5 Evaluation

Maintenance of the dam is poor and requires a great deal of improvement. Due to the inoperable condition of the gates to the 9 foot diameter conduit and the right sluice gate, the operational procedures are quite limited.

A formal program of operation and maintenance procedures should be implemented, to include documentation providing complete records for future reference. A formal warning system should be developed and implemented within the time frame indicated in Section 7.1c. Remedial operation and maintenance measures are presented in Section 7.

SECTION 5: HYDRAULIC/HYDROLOGIC

5.1 Evaluation of Features

- a. General The dam is a high spillage-low storage type project with a drainage area in excess of 50 square miles.
- b. Design Data No computations could be found for the original dam construction or the 1901 construction of the present dam.
- c. Experience Data No information on serious problem situations arising at the dam has been found, and it does not appear the dam has been overtopped. The maximum known height of water over the spillway was during an ice storm about 5 years ago at which time a nearby resident of the area reported measuring 21 inches of water over the spillway crest.
- d. Visual Observations Trees in the downstream channel could partially hinder flow during very high water, but this would not be a problem as the downstream channel is quite large immediately below the dam. Debris being carried downstream by heavy flows could cause partial blockage of the channel where it passes under the Union Street bridge, or could actually cause damage or the collapse of the bridge.
- e. Test flood Analysis The test flood for this high hazard, small size dam is equivalent to one-half of the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). Based upon "Preliminary Guidance for Estimating Maximum Probable Discharges", dated March, 1978, peak inflow to the reservoir is 31,000 cfs (Appendix D-8); peak outflow (Test Flood) is 30,500 cfs with the dam overtopped 3.9 feet (Appendix D-13). Based upon our hydraulics computations, the spillway capacity is 8400 cfs, which is equivalent to approximately 28 percent of the Test Flood.
- f. Dam Failure Analysis Utilizing the April, 1978, "Rule of Thumb Guidance for Estimating Downstream Dam Failure Hydrographs", the peak failure outflow from the dam breaching would be 41,600 cubic feet per second. A breach of the dam would result in approximately 15 foot high waves, both immediately downstream of the dam and at the houses and commercial buildings in the initial impact area 8000 feet downstream of the dam near North Adams Street (Appendix D-17).

SECTION 6: STRUCTURAL STABILITY

6.1 Evaluation of Structural Stability

a. <u>Visual Observations</u> - Severe deterioration of the concrete downstream face of the dam due to observed seepage could quite possibly endanger the future safety and stability of the dam.

The damage to the gatehouse is extensive. The structure or portions of it could be subject to future collapse endangering anyone in it, such as as children living in the area that might use the dam and gatehouse as a playground.

b. Design and Construction Data - Other than the one plan dated 1901 for the construction of the present dam, no data pertaining to the construction of the dam was available. Substantial repairs were performed in 1972 as described in Section 1.2g. The repairs included removal and replacement of deteriorated concrete and filling the jackhammered areas with pressure grout near the base of the downstream face. During the removal of deteriorated concrete, it was possible to observe the composition of the core of the spillway section. It was described as follows in a letter from Mr. O'Brien to the Town of Manchester, dated October 12, 1971.

"The jack-hammering of deteriorated surface material as called for on the approved plans had revealed that instead of a solid concrete overflow section on top of the old masonry structure, it was merely a shell of concrete varying from a 6-inch thickness on the downstream side to somewhat more on the upstream, with a core of trap-rock aggregate. It appeared that most of the aggregate had absolutely no cement around it and had been just dumped in using the downstream shell and both the old masonry dam and the upstream wall as forms. There was a fair amount of earth (loam) and root structures within the core exposed at one point on the downstream face."

The 1971-1972 repairs included the installation of vertical or almost vertical, No. 8 reinforcing bars spaced 10 ft. on centers, from the top of the spillway section of the dam. The specifications required installation of the bars in 20 ft. deep, 2 in. diameter holes, with subsequent grouting, and in addition, the specifications stated that "if large voids are encountered, pressure grouting may be required."

The analyses made of the stability of the dam by others prior to the 1971-1972 repairs indicated a very low factor of safety against overturning and sliding under high water when making the assumption that there are horizontal surfaces through the dam across which there is only frictional resistance to movement (no cohesion or tensional resistance). This assumption was made because of the extensive horizontal cracks observed at the time. the dam is not of solid concrete, the stability action of the reinforcing bars is difficult to assess. The procedure described in the specifications for the installation of the bars does not ensure that these bars will not corrode in the zone where they are exposed to seepage flow in the uncemented "trap-rock aggregate." Thus, on the basis of available information, long-term reliance on the reinforcing bars for stability is not warranted.

The design and construction data available is not sufficient to perform an analyses of the overturning and sliding stability of the dam. Major considerations affecting stability which are not known include the location and character of the dam-rock interface both under the original dam and the 1901 dam.

- 6.1.c Operating Records There are no records available concerning the development of spalling and cracking or other features which influence stability.
- 6.1.d <u>Post-Construction Changes</u> There are no records of post-construction changes other than those of the repairs discussed in Section 6.1.b.
- e. Seismic Stability The dam is in Seismic Zone 1 and according to the Recommended Guidelines, need not be evaluated for seismic stability.

7.1 Dam Assessment

a. <u>Condition</u> - Based upon the visual inspection and past performance, the dam appears to be in poor condition. The general stability of the dam is questionable. The earth dike to the left of the gatehouse is in good condition with no evidence of sloughing or erosion. Areas of concern of the dam include the heavy deterioration of the downstream face of the spillway and seepage eminating from these deteriorated portions. The overall stability of the dam relating to the condition of the reinforcing bars installed in 1972, the composition of the dam core, and the amount and path of seepage through the dam is also in question. The condition of the 9 foot diameter conduit and gate is unknown. There are other less critical areas requiring attention, as well.

Based upon "Preliminary Guidance for Estimating Maximum Probable Discharges" dated March, 1978, peak inflow to the reservoir is 31,000 cubic feet per second; peak outflow (Test Flood) is 30,500 cubic feet per second with the dam overtopped 3.9 feet. Based upon our hydraulics computations, the spillway capacity is 8400 cubic feet per second, which is equivalent to approximately 28 percent of the Test Flood.

- b. Adequacy of Information The information available is not plentiful enough, nor is it accurate enough, to permit an in-depth analysis of the stability of the dam. Therefore, this assessment of the stability of the dam must be based upon visual inspection, past performance of the dam, and only rough checks of past computations by others.
- c. <u>Urgency</u> It is recommended that the measures presented in Section 7.2 be implemented immediately upon the owner's receipt of this report. The measures presented in Section 7.3 should be implemented within 1 year of the owner's receipt of this report.
- d. Need for Additional Information There is a need for additional information as recommended in Section 7.2.

7.2 Recommendations

- 1. Based upon the rough computations in Appendix D, the dam spillway capacity will be exceeded by the Test Flood. More sophisticated flood routing should be undertaken by hydrolgists/hydraulics engineers to refine the Test Flood figures. A study should be undertaken and recommendations made to increase the spillway capacity based upon the refined Test Flood figures. Recommendations should also be made to increase the capacity of the low level outlets.
- 2. A registered professional engineer qualified in dam inspection should investigate the stability of the dam. In particular, the engineer should consider the effects of:
- a. The degree of corrosion of the reinforcing bars installed in 1972.
- b. The build up of hydrostatic pressure in the rubble core of the dam described as "trap rock aggregate", which appears to constitute the body of the dam.
- c. The serious loss of structural quality and continuity of the downstream concrete shell which is the outer surface of the spillway face.

Subsequent recommendations should be made to satisfy the stability deficiencies of the dam, to eliminate seepage through the dam, and to provide methods of repair or replacement of the deteriorated surfaces of the concrete.

3. A registered professional engineer qualified in dam inspection should also be retained to investigate the 9 foot diameter conduit. A determination should be made of whether or not the conduit has been sealed off and if it has been, where. According to the Town of Manchester, a contract is to be let out to install a sewer line in Union Street, with an item included for the cutoff and sealing of the conduit. This will occur at least 80 feet from the gate structure, which is far enough so that deterioration of the gate structure and the remaining conduit could cause serious erosion of the dike, the left abutment of the dam, the left bridge abutment to the Union Street bridge, or Union Street itself. If the conduit is to be sealed, it should be sealed permanently as close to the gate as possible.

However, if possible, consideration should first be given to rennovating the conduit for use as another low level outlet during times of high water, or to lower the water level quickly should an emergency situation arise.

7.3 Remedial Measures

- a. Operation and Maintenance Procedures The following measures should be undertaken within the time frame in icated in Section 7.1.C, and continued on a regular basis where applicable.
- l. Round-the-clock surveillance should be provided by the owner during periods of unusually heavy precipitation. The owner should develop a formal warning system for alerting downstream residents in case of an emergency.
- 2. A formal program of operation and maintenance procedures should be instituted and fully documented to provide accurate records for future reference.
- 3. A program of inspection by a registered, professional engineer qualified in dam inspection should be instituted on an annual basis. The inspections should be technical in nature, and should include the operation of the outlet works.
- 4. The badly damaged gatehouse is a hazard and should be made completely inaccessible to trespassing, or it should be removed.
- 5. The right sluice gate should be made operable, and the low level waste gate at the right end of the dam should be maintained regularly to render it easily operable.
- 6. The low areas of the earthen dike, particularly adjacent to the fence around the gatehouse, should be raised to the same elevation as the top of the dam.
- 7. Trees growing on the earthen dike near the gatehouse should be removed.
- 8. Contact seeps at the right dam abutment and along the toe of the dam-bedrock interface should be monitored regularly for significant increases in seepage volume not related to fluctuations of the pond water level.
- 9. The vertical pipes along the crest of the spillway (Photos 2 and 3) should be removed.

7.4 Alternatives

This study has identified no alternatives to the above recommendations and remedial measures.

APPENDIX

SECTION A: VISUAL OBSERVATIONS

VISUAL INSPECTION CHECK LIST PARTY ORGANIZATION

PROJECT (NOTON LOTAL)	UA11	DATE: 1/6/. 2 /,	1718
		TIME: 6:30 A	ri
		WEATHER: 110Y.	COLD
		w.s. elev. زين ت	.sDN.S
PARTY:	INITIALS:	DISCIP	LINE:
1. PETEL HEYMEN!	PAIH	CHUI	ENGRES, INC
2. CALING GOLL SMITH	CRCI	CAHIU E	NOIS, ZAC.
3. GONTANIO CHOICE	CIC	GECTECHIL	THE ENGLY
4			
5			
6			
PROJECT FEATURE		INSPECTED BY	REMARKS
1. CONCRETE ALUTH	3175	PMH, CSE, GC	
2. EALTH DIKE EPIBAR	RAISAIT	131:4,006,60	
S. GATTHOUSE AND 9"DI	A. CONDUCT	PMH, CRG, GC	
4. LEFT HEUTHENT	OUTLETS	DNH, CRG, GC	
5. SPILL WAY AND DISH.	ARCK CHAN	NEL PHH, Con	<u> </u>
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			

PERIODIC INS	PECTION CHECK LIST Page A-2
PROJECT CHANGE DECEMBER 19	
PROJECT FEATURE CON AND	AFTHERTO BY PUBLICAGE
AREA EVALUATED	CONDITION
DAN EMBANKMENT	
Crest Elevation	EL. 146.7
Current Pool Elevation	EL. 133.5 (LATER VICTO-EL. 14%
Maximum Impoundment to Date	
Surface Cracks	Men & CECENTERL
Pavement Condition	SUITE MINCH SURFACE
no for Settlement of Coest	VICTE PECER ITE
Lateral Movement	MAN CESTA WED
Vertical Alignment	APPENKS GOL
Horizontal Alignment	MATTARES GOOD
Condition at Abutment and at Concrete Structures	CONCRETE ON TOP OF ABUTNESSTS
Indications of Movement of Structural Items on Slopes	NA
Trespassing on Slopes	NA
Sloughing or Erosion of Slopes or Abutments	NA
Rock Slope Protection-Riprap Failures	NA
Unusual Movement or Cracking at or Near Toes	NONE OBSERVEL
Unusual Embankment or Downstream Geepage	CONTACT SEET AT RIGHT ABUTMENT
Piping or Boils	NONE OBSERVED

NONE KNOWN

NON'E KNOUN

NONE

Foundation Drainage Features

Instrumentation System

Toe Drains

Page 4-3

PROJECT LA ICI I LAN DAM

Trespassing on Slopes

DATE 15/27/9/8

PROJECT FEATURE S'ALTH DIKE SINESIAKINGAT BY MINH, C.C.G., GC

AREA EVALUATED	CONDITION
DIKE EMBANKMENT	
Crest Elevation	KRECIOENK - 146. T. TIVICAL)
Current Pool Elevation	133.5
Maximum Impoundment to Date	
Surface Cracks	NONE OBSERVED
Pavement Condition	\sim A
Movement or Settlement of Crest	NONE OBSERVED
Lateral Movement	NONE OBSELVED
Vertical Alignment	TOO PRREGULAR TO JUDGE
Horizontal Alignment	TOO IEREGIDEAR TO JUDGE
Condition at Abutment and at Concrete Structures	HOUSE FENCE. HERE DIKE IS
Indications of Movement of Structural Items on Slopes	NA
Sloughing or Erosion of Slopes or Abutments	MINUTE SLOWGIAING OF US
Rock Slope Protection-Riprap Failures	110 ROCK SLOPE PROTECTION
Unusual Movement or Cracking at or Near Toes	NONE OBSERVED
Unusual Embankment or Downstream Seepage	NONE OBSERVEL - NO WATER BEHIND DIKE AT FIRST VISIT, THEN
Piping or Boils	WATER BEHIND DIKE AND ENOWON! GROUND
Foundation Drainage Features	NONE NONE DECERVED
Toe Drains	NONE OBSERVED
Instrumentation System	NONE

MINUOR

Page 1-4

PROJECT ON 1000 A SALE SAND

DATE NOV. 27 11/6

PROJECT FEATURE CHILE HOUTE AND I CONDUT BY CHIH.CRC. T.

AREA EVALUATED

CONDITION:

OUTLET WORKS-CONTROL TOWER

: a) Concrete and Structural

General Condition

Condition of Joints

Spalling

Visible Reinforcing

Theting or Staining of Concrete

Any Seepage or Efflorescence

Joint Alignment

Unusual Seepage or Leaks in Gate Chamber

Cracks

Rusting or Corrosion of Steel

Mechanical and Electrical

Air Vents

Float Wells

Crane Hoist

Elevator

Hydraulic System

Service Gates

Emergency Gates

Lightning Protection System

Emergency Power System

Wiring and Li-hting System

18% Y PORTY - 1 WALL DEMIDLISHED AND GATE MECHANISM EXPOSED GOOD, EXCEPT LEFT WILLIAMALL WITH HOLIZONITHE CLINICAL SOME MEOUNA TRINSH RACKS NONE OBSERVED

NONE OF CONCERN

MENIE OBS-CVEU

4 INCH DIETERLENCE TONILEFT NINGWHIL CRACK.

NONE CHICELIVED

WINCOMPLE HAZ CHATTHOUSE

MAI.

TRACK RACKS BENT AND HEAVILY CORRODEU

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

GATE TO 9 CONDUIT NOT OPER ABLE

NONE KNOWN

NA

NH

NA

Page A-5

PROJECT WALL IN 1 201

DATE NOV. 27, 1776

PROJECT FEATURE LEFT MESTIMENT STLETS BY FAITH, CALL GC

AREA EVALUATED

CONDITION

OUTLET WORKS-OUTLET STRUCTURE, AND

'General Condition of Concrete

Rust or Staining

Spalling

Erosion or Cavitation

Visible Reinforcing

Any Long or Efflorescence

(Condition at Joints

Drain Holes

Channel

Loose Rock or Trees Overhanging Channel

Condition of Discharge Channel

"UPSTREAM GATES

WASTE GATE LOW

LEVEL OUTLET

9 FOOT WAINFTER CONDUIT

GOOU

11/1/OF

SUME AROUND SLUICE

GATE OUTLETS

NA

NONE OBJECT

NOTE CHICKA FL

SOME CRACKING OF

EUTRETUES AT JOINTS

NONE OBSERVED

SOME ON LAFFT ABUTMENT

NOT OF CONSCERN

GRAVEL STREAMBED

LEFT GATE ONLY, IS OFFICELE

SATE OFFIABLE WITH JACK

AS TRASH RACK

CONDITION NOT KNOWN -

NO FLOW FROM DE ENT

OF CONDUIT

Page H-6

PROJECT UNION POND CHIL

DATE 1/01, 27, 1778

PROJECT FEATURE SPILLWHY AND DISCHAFGE BY MIH CLE, GC

AREA EVALUATED

CONDITION

OUTLET WORKS-SPILLWAY WEIR, APPROACH AND DISCHARGE CHANNELS

a) Approach Channel

General Condition

Loose Rock Overhanging Channel

Trees Overhanging Channel

Floor of Approach Channel

Weil Training Walls

General Condition of Concrete

Rust or Staining

Spalling

Any Visible Reinforcing

Any Seepage of Efflorescence

Drain Holes

c) Discharge Channel

General Condition

Loose Rock Overhanging Channel

Trees Overhanging Channel

Floor of Channel

Other Obstructions

SHALLOW SLOPE-CLAY BLAIRET

300D

NONE

NONE

CLAY ELANKET

US FACE VERY POOR - CREST AND UPS FACE GUNINITE GOOD

DISFACE STAINJED

DIS FACE HEAVILY SPACLED WITH CAVITATION AND CRACKING

NONE OBSERVED

DIS FACE SEEPHOE IS EXTENSIVE BUT NOT A LARGE FLOW

SEETHERE FROM NUMBEROUS DRAIN HOLES

TREES AND LADEN WITH TRASH

NONE OF CONCERN

ON RIGHT BANK AND IN CHANNEL

ROCK AND GRAVEL WITH TREES

BRIDGE COLUMINS AND SUPPORTS

IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM

APPENDIX


SECTION B: EXISTING DATA

APPENDIX

SECTION B. EXISTING DATA UNION POND DAM

Dam Plan, Profile and Sections		
List of Existing PlansB-2		
Summary of Data and CorrespondenceB-3	to	B-5
Data and Correspondence		

Page



LIST OF EXISTING PLANS

"Gate House and Dam" July 27, 1901 A.C. Rice, Engineer

"Typical Sectional View Rehabilitation of Union Pond Dam" September 23, 1970 Walter J. Senkow, Manchester Town Engineer

SUMMARY OF DATA AND CORRESPONDENCE

	FROM	WO .	SUBJECT	PAGE
	Sta	State board for the Supervision of Dams	Inventory Data	B-6
William D. O'Neill Director of Public Works Town of Manchester	Wil	William H. O'Brien III Civil Engineer	Inspection Report on Union Pond Dam	B-7
William D. O'Neill	Cla Ass	Clarence Welti Associates Inc.	Inspection Report and repair recommendations	B-9
Contract Bidders	Tov Put Eng	Town of Manchester Public Works Dept. Engineering Division	"Special Conditions Rehabiliatation of Union Pond Dam" with drawing	B-1 (
William H. O'Brien III Water Resources Comm.	H. Mac Eng	H. R. Hoffman P.E. Macchi & Hoffman, Engineers	Further recommendations for rehabilitation of dam.	B-14
Robert B. Weiss General Manager Town of Manchester	Wil	Wiliam H. O'Brien III	Necessity of revising dam rehabilitation plans due to discovery that 1901 plan of dam is incorrect.	B-16

PAGE	đ Dam	B-21	nd B-23	ow's B-26 ons m- ch)	ng B-29	B-37	h of B-38 aced f dam
SUBJECT	Analysis of Union Pond for stability against overturning	Field inspection of construction work	"Analysis of Union Pond Dam-12 Foot Section"	Concurrence with Senkow's overturning calculations and supplemental recommendations (with sketch)	Calculations concerning overturning of dam	"Typical Dam Repair" Detail sketches of repairs	Description and sketch of clay blanket to be placed along upstream face of dam
FROM	Walter J. Senk w Town Engineer, Manchester	William H. O'srien III	Walter J. Senkow	Clarence Welti	Macchi & Hoffman, Engineers	The Penetryn System Inc. Rehabilitation Contractor	Walter J. Senkow
외	Clarence Welti	Walter J. Senkow	Clarence Welti	Walter J. Senkow	Files	Files	Jose H. Cosio Chief Engineer Macchi & Hoffman
DATE	Oct. 14	Oct. 20 1971	Oct. 26 1971	Nov. 1 1971	Nov. 5 1971	No date	July 21 1972

-([

PAGE	B-40
SUBJECT	Recommendation that conditonal approval be granted to fill reservoir
FROM	A.J. Macchi Macchi & Hoffr In, Engineers
외	William H. O'Brien III
DATE	Aug. 7 1972

Control of the second second

E

Additional correspondence not included herein is available from the State of Connecticut and Town of Manchester f les. NOTE:

STATE BOARD FOR THE SUPERVISION OF DAMS INVENTORY DATA

NAME OF	F DAM OR POND Union Pond
CODE NO	ON OF STRUCTURE: $144.41-18-00$
LOCATIO	ON OF STRUCTURE: 14t. 41-18-00
,	Town Manchester
	Name of Stream Hockanum River
	U.S.G.S. Quad. Manchester Long. Lat.
OWNER:	Connecticut Light & Power
	Address Manchester Town of Manchester
	Telephone 41 CENTER St.
	3 Man chester
Total L	ength of Dam 300 + Length of Spillway 200 + Concrete and stone
Type of	Dike Construction
Downstr	eam Conditions
Summary	of File Duta
inspec	This is a major structure and while it appears sound, should be ted by Board Member.

September 5, ist:

Mr. William D. O'Noill Director of Public Works Town of Manchester Manchester, Connecticut 06040

> Subj: Union Pond Dam Marichester

Dear Mr. O'Neilli

On August 21, 1960, the undersigned inspected the subject dam at mour request.

There were no indications that this structure was in a hazardous condition, but there has been a visible lack of maintenance for many years and the structure is in need of repair before serious structural deterioration sets in.

The Water Resources Commission has jurisdiction over all dams, " - - - which by breaking away or otherwise, might endanger life or property - - ", as explained in the enclosed copy of the General Statutes.

The concrete on the downstream face of the spillway and apron had spalled off to a depth of approximately one foot and several square feet in area at several places, and cement which was used to repair cracks has fallen out in places. The supports for the stems which raise and lower the gates have become detached from the upstream face of the dam, and are so rusted and bent that they appear permanently inoperable with the existing mechanism.

Because of these facts, and because this dam would cause damage in the event of failure, and because continued delay in the repair of this dam could lead to an ORDER from this Commission to repair or remove the structure, which expense would no doubt be much greater at that time, it would seem prudent for the town to have an engineering report made on this structure to determine what repairs should be made, and to schedule such repairs sometime within the next year or so.

F.

Ar. William D. O'Neill - 2 -Se, tember 5, 1968 We have written to the previous owner of the dam, Connecticut Power Company, inquiring if they have any plans or specifications on this structure. May we hear from you as to your intentions in this matter for our records? Very truly yours, William H. C'Brien III Civil Engineer WHOIII: vhb Enc.

OLAHENCE WELT ASSOCIATES, INC.

(203) 633 462 (

Ascost 1 -, 1 -7

CLARENCE W VILT

EDHARD J

THE STEET OF PUBLIC WORKS TON OF PUBLIC WORKS TO A STEET OF PUBLIC WORKS TO A STEET OF THE STEET

TELL LARGENATION OF BARRAGON HOLDS

7.5 71 m 1

TO THE BURNEST TO A MANAGE OF THE THE DATE OF THE PARENCE ARE TO SEE WITH A PROPERTY OF THE SEE WITH THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE

THE CONTROL OF THE PROPERTY OF THE DARK AS EAST OF THE DARK AS EAST OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE TOP DESCRIPTION OF

Supplemental to the question of stability of the top concrete is the lepth of present disintegration of concrete and the possible existence of hid en horizontal cracks. Juch cracks and disintegration can with the aid of frost promuedate to produce possible critical stability situations. The one safeguarding feature at this point is the general lack of vertical cracking which would induate blocks and cause dangerously critical strictlity situation. The north exposure of the face of the ban is, however, an accepted ating factor in promulgation frost tracking and disintegration.

THE QUESTION OF FUNCTION ON THE GATES ADDS TO THE PHORIEM AT THE DAM. SHO LD THERE BE A CRITICAL SETUATION THESE SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF IMMEDIATE OPENING.

MEVIEWING ALL OF THE ABOVE THE FOLLOWING ARE BASES RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. OPEN EXISTING GATES TO ASCENTAIN FUNCTIONING OF GATES AND LOWER POND TO LEVEL AT OLD STONE DAM. GATES SHOULD BE REPAIRED.

State Of Marita which

- 2'. DETERMENE BY FROBING THE EXISTE. OF FUSSIBLE JOINTING OR CRACKING AT THE TOP F THE OLD CAM AND THE NEW SPILLWAY AT THE BACK OF THE JAM.
- 7. MARE JACK ARMER HOLES AT 101 CENTER ALGROSTES TOO OF THE COD STONE DAM TO S FOOT DEPTH TO ASCERTAIN PROSTRIE CARGE VOICES BY TV. STONE DAM.
- AND MAKE AGGITTONAL HOLES OF MEDICARY.
- S. CH 1 FOOT CENTER OFFICE 2 HOCEC T RUGGE TOP OF THE SPEECHAY INTO THE FED STONE DAM AND POSSIBLY ON A HEAVE INTO LOWER CONCRETE FOR A DEETH OF 20 FEET. NOTO HEINFORCING BARS AND ON TED. IF LARGE VOIOS ARE ENCOUNTERED PRESSURE OFFICE TING MAY BE REQUIRED.
- to face terth or a minimum of 1. " ; hemove all distategrated conchete and probe large cracks with Jack hammer to letermine possibility of promulgation of such cracks.
- 7. AFTER THE ABOVE IS COMPLETED THE SURFACE SHOULD BE COVERED WITH O' X O' MESH, ANCHORED INTO THE CONCRETE AND A MINIMUM OF 4" OF GINITE CONCRETE PLACED OVER THE GLACIAL AREA WHERE CRACKING AND DISINTEGRATION ARE OCCURING. ALL BEEP, CLEANED-OUT CRACKS AND REM VED, DICINTEGRATED, POHITONS SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE FIRST FILLED IN WITH GUNITE CONCRETE.

THILL THE ABOVE REPRESENTS A PASIC REHABILITATION OF THE DAY, IT WOULD CERTAINED BE NECESSARY TO CAREFULLY INSPECT THE STRUCTURE AFTER DRAWDOWN TO ASCENTAIN THE NECESSARY OF THE ABOVE ASPAIRS, AS WELL AS POSSIBLE ASSISTED REPAIRS. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE ANALYSES AROVE IS QUITE CONSERVATIVE. HOWEVER, EXPERIENCE OF THE WRITER WITH DAM FAILURES INDICATE THAT CAUSES OF FAILURE ARE OFTEN REMOTELY ELUSIVE ASD YET THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE ARE ALMOST ALWAYS DISASTOROUS. IT IS THEREFORE SECOMMENDED THAT THE WATER BE MAINTAINED 6 FEET BELOW THE TOP OF THE DAM CREST UNTIL DAMAGE, IF ANY, IS ASCEPTAINED AND REPAIRS ARE MADE.

VERY TRULY YOURS,

CLARENCE W. WELLI, P.E.

TOWN OF MANUHESTER, CONTECTIOUT PUBLIC VORKS DEPARTMENT FROM SELENO DIVIDION

CHARL COMPARISON

REMARKATIVATION OF UNION FORE DAM

This work will consist of inspecting, evaluating, removing 6 inches to 12 inches of disintegrated and loose concrete and repairing with ganite. A field inspection of the Dam, by the prospective bidder, is encouraged and shop drawings for the repair of the sluide gates and waste gate are requested by the Town for its review. Waste gate repair will be an add item which the Town may or may not do. It is the Contractor's responsibility to seek out disintegrated concrete by probing, removing and repairing deteriorated or cracked areas with gunite. Special attention shall be given by probing for the existence of possible jointing or cracking at the top of the old Dam, new spillway at the back of the Dam, and the upstream face of the dam; this distance along the top of the Dam is about 300 feet. The Contractor will furnish all labor, tools equipment and materials for all work performed.

Contractor will make jack harmer holes at 10 foot centers along the top of the old so. From to a depth of 5 feet to determine any large voids in the stone Dam. These voids will be filled with pressure grout and additional holes will be made if necessary. Pressure grouting will be based on the contractor furnishing and placing 350 cubic feet of pressure grout. Should the amount of grout used increase or decrease from 350 cubic feet, the lump sum bid price will be increased or decreased based on this difference at a unit price of \$10/cubic foot.

Contractor will drill 2 inch holes 10 feet on centers through the top of the spillway into the old stone Dam, possibly on a slope, into lower concrete, for a depth of 20 feet. Number 8 reinforcing bars shall be placed in such holes and grouted. If large voids are encountered, pressure grouting may be required. Pressure grouting will be based on the contractor furnishing and placing 350 cubic feet of pressure grout. Should the amount of grout used increase or decrease from 350 cubic feet, the lump sum bid price will be increased or decreased based on this difference at a unit price of \$10/cubic foot.

Contractor on the back and face of the concrete Dam, the upstream face, and the downstream face, will chip out all cracks to full depth or a minimum of 12 inches. All disintegrated concrete will be removed and large cracks will be probed with a jack hammer to determine the possibility of the penetration of the cracks deeper into the Dam. Deficiencies will be repaired to the satisfaction of the Inspector. The surface will then be covered with 6 inch by 6 inch mesh, #12/12 gauge, anchored into the concrete, and a minimum of 4 inches of gunite concrete will be placed over the area where cracking and disintegration are occurring. All disintegrated portions shall be removed and cracks cleaned out and then filled with gunite concrete. The quantity of numite claimed payment for rill be verified by the inspector. Contractor will furnish all labor, tools and materials to perform the above work, and will be paid on a per cubic foot basis.

7.

Sheet 2 Special Conditions Rehabilitation of Union Pond Dam

The bown will draw the water down to allow the Contractor to do the above work. Gunite shall be mixed in proporti a of one rack of Fortland Coment to 3-1/2 cubic feet of sand and mixed thoroughly in a day rbate. The much will be 6 inch by 6 inch, #12/12 gauge and conform to the Standard Specification of the American Society for Testing Enterials for "Gold Frawn Steel Wire for Concrete Reinforcement", Serial Designation A 62-34. The much shall be anchored to the existing concrete by 1/4 inch diameter expansion hook bolts 24 inches on center. Material shall not be placed on a frezen surface nor during freezing weather; below 32° Fahrenheit. Gunited surface will be sprayed with a liquid membrane curing compound. Curing compound shall be similar or equal to Demicon "Cure Hard" or Scaltight "Cure Hard" with fugitive dye and shall meet the latest A.S.T.M. Specification C-156.

C. W. Conder on Odra, Class film Ora Bara (d.) Chy out allements onchor wire mesh and place gunit over surfaces Cld Dam old Abutement in places I'w Spillway - --170cK

Typical Sectional View Scale 1=10°
Fehabilitation of Union Fond Dam 923/70 W.J.S.

HARTFORD, CONN., 06105

PHONE (203) 525,6631

A. J. MACCHI H. R. HOFFMAN J. J. SCHMID

PROF. C. W. DUNHAM

October 22, 1970

STATE WATER PESOURCES
COMMISSION
RECEIVED

001 2 5 1970

State of Connecticut Water Resources Commission State Office Building Hartford, Connecticut

Attention Mr. William H. O'Brien Civil Engineer

Re: Union Pond Dam
Manchester, Connecticut

Genua n:

We have received and reviewed the following data as submitted by the commission, as requested in your letter of September 28, 1970.

- 1. Contract proposal for the rehabilitation of Union Pond Dam Bid No. B-27, as prepared by the Town of Manchester.
- 2. One copy of a typical sectional view of Union Pond Dam dated September 23, 1970 showing details of the dam rehabilitation.
- 3. One copy of a report dated August 10, 1970 prepared by Clarence Welti Associates Inc. for the Town of Manchester, Connecticut.

Field inspection trips were made to the dam site on Wednesday, October 14, 1970 and on Tuesday, October 20, 1970. The downstream face of the dam was inspected.

We are submitting a report of our inspections and findings on the safety of this structure as follows:

- The dam, as it now stands, is in an unsafe condition.
- 2. We are in agreement with Clarence Welti Associates recommendation that a basic rehabilitation is necessary.
- 3. We are submitting the following recommendations and exceptions to the special conditions for the rehabilitation of

7 [--]

Re: Union Pond Dam

the dam as outlined in the specification as prepared by the Town of Manchester.

A. It would appear that the proposed method of repair does not fully insure against further deterioration because of the fact that at present it does not appear that any repair work is intended for the sources of leakage through the dam i.e. the upstream face of the dam.

It is recommended that the pond be drawn down to permit the entire upstream face of the dam to be repaired and made watertight.

- B. All of the evaluation as to the extent of hidden cracking, voids or deterioration and to what extent they be repaired seems to be left with the contractor who has a fixed contract to do work that can only be determined after extensive probing. It is our opinion that fulltime inspection be done by a registered Professional Engineer.
- C. We do not feel, at this time, that the rehabilitation of the dam, as presently outlined, will place the structure in what we regard as a safe condition.

Very truly yours,

MACCHI & HOFFMAN, ENGINEERS

H. R. HOFFMAN, P.E.

HRH/mcb

cc:

WATER RESOURCES

October 12, 1971

Town of Manchester Municipal Building 41 Center Street Manchester, Connecticut

Attention: Mr. Robert B. Weiss, General Manager

Re: Union Pond Dam Manchester

Gentlemen:

On October 4, 1971, there was a field meeting at the subject dam with the undersigned, our consultant, Mr. Robert Hoffman and Mr. Walter Senkow of your engineering department in attendance.

The jack-hammoring of deteriorated surface material as called for on the approved plans had revealed that instead of a solid concrete overflow section on top of the old masonry structure, it was merely a shell of concrete varying from a 6-inch thickness on the downstream side to somewhat more on the upstream, with a core of trap-rock aggregate. It appeared that most of the aggregate had absolutely no cement around it and had been just dumped in using the downstream shell and both the old masonry dam and the upstream wall as forms. There was a fair amount of earth (loam) and root structures within the core exposed at one point on the downstream face.

The design of repairs to the structure were based on plans of the dam dated 1901 which have now been shown to be incorrect.

We request that the original design engineer, Clarence Welti review the stability of this new-found section and revise the plans to ensure the continued safety of the structure. Such revisions must have prior approval of this Department before proceeding.

We understand that you are having the upstream face of the old masonry dam exposed by excavation. This is presumably to determine

-16

the practicality or necessity of waterproofing the entire upstream face. It is most important to provide a positive seal against water entering the core.

Very truly yours,

William H. O'Brien III Civil Engineer

Wilo mi

cc: Robert Roffman
Walter Senkow
Commissioner Lufkin, Dept. of Environmental Protection

October 14, 1971

Clarence Welti Engineering Company 100 Sycamore Glastonbury, Connecticut

Subject: Analysis of Union Pend Dam for Stability against Overturning

Dear Clarence:

I have enclosed calculations I intend to send to the State which will indicate that Union Pand Dam will not overturn, even if there was two feet of water going over its crest. I don't believe this has ever occurred. As we discussed the inner core was bucyed by water and weighed only 80%/cu. ft., hydrostatic pressure acted on the bottom of the Dam in a triangular pressure pattern.

I would be pleased to hear your comments on this matter.

Very truly yours,

VJS:r Enc. Whiter J. Senkow Town Engineer

co: Robert B. Weiss, General Manager William D. O'Neili, Director of Public Works Total A rea of Dam Cross section, taking a Section between the A, = (1/2) (3') (5') = 7.5" old and new doins. This section rule a height of 8 feet on the upstream plane.

(5') (25) + (3) (25) (25) = 16.7"

 $A_3 = (2')(7.25') = 14.5''$ $A_4 = (1')(8.75.5') = 16.3''$

A5 = = 3.3°


 $\begin{bmatrix} A_G & = 2^{n} \end{bmatrix}$

A7 = 8"

 $= 1,920'^{#} + 7,080'^{#} + 8,700'^{#} + 1,890'^{#} + 2,624'^{#} + 2,250'^{#} + 10,800'^{#}$ $[. -18,802'^{#} - 6,250'^{#} - 8,333'^{#}$ $= 35,264'^{#} - 33,385'^{#} = 1,879'^{#} \text{ against overturning}$

Factor of Safety = 35264'# = 1.06

Dam will not overturn event its inner core was completly saturated and buoyed up by a hydrostatic pressure oching underneath the dam. A theoretical I bot section was used. The actual moment against against overhaning would still be greater because it is constructed in a L' configuration. A 2 bout head was assumed over the top of the dam: this in actually has not been known to occur.



Water Resources

October 20, 1971

Mr. Walter J. Senkow Town Engineer Town of Manchester Municipal Building 41 Center Street Manchester, Connecticut

> Re: Union Pond Dam Manchester

Dear Mr. Senkows

At our field inspection of the subject dam on October 19, 1971, the following were in attendance: Robert Hoffman, our consultant; yourself; Mr. Anthony Fonte, contractor, of Penetryn Systems, Inc; and the undersigned.

Work was proceeding on removal of loose or deteriorated concrete on both faces of the dam. Some 4 or 5 feet of fill had been removed on the upstream side of the dam exposing portions of the shelf (shown on section C-D of the original plans about 8 feet below the spillway crest and a part of the "old dam"). In some areas the brownstone masonry could be seen and in other areas the original dam appears to have been covered by concrete - probably at an earlier time than the main concrete of the new dam because it was in extremely poor condition. In some areas the fill had been excavated, according to Mr. Senkow, to within a few inches of bed rock.

It was your intention to cover the upstream face with 3 inches of gunite to make this face waterproof. We would concur that this is an important step.

We wish to further emphasize that the stability of the structure under all conditions must be re-evaluated because the existing structure was found to be quite different from that assumed in the original analysis. The original design engineer should be called in at this point to re-evaluate the situation. We therefore request:

 That Clarence Welti submit a letter to this department stating that he has inspected the existing conditions and has analyzed the stability of the structure, under certain defined conditions and stating his conclusions and recommendations. [2]

 That such conclusions and recommendations be submitted for the approval of this department.

Very truly yours,

William H. O'Brien, III Civil Engineer

WHO:1jg

cc: William O'Neill
Robert B. Weiss
Robert Hoffman
Dan W. Lufkin, Commissioner
Department of Environmental Protection

October 26, 1971

Mr. Clarence Welti 100 Sycamore Glastonbury, Connecticut

Subject: Analysis of Union Pond Dam - 12 Foot Section

Dear Clarence:


I have enclosed calculations showing a 12 foot upstream section with two feet of surcharge on it; again the dam won't overturn. The factor of safety appears to remain at a constant value, slightly greater than one along the dam's slope. Below this elevation the downstream face blends into a curve which creates a base far more stable than the above section. I'm also including a copy of Mr. O'Brien's letter to me dated October 20th.

Water Resources is requesting a letter that you approve of meshing and guniting the upstream face before starting the gunite operation. If you agree with the stability calculations please send them along saying you concur with it.

Very truly yours,

Walter J. Senkow Town Engineer

WJS:r Enc. cc: William D. O'Neill, Director of Public Works



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4500
                87 5.0#/0'
                                                                                            Section with 14 feet of Head - Bottom of Dam
                                                                                           Using no old dam projection. A saturald busyed inn
                                                                                           Core was ossumd; this would never occur to this extension actuality. Dam would still not be overturned.
                                       Tit i Area of Dam Section
                                A:=(/2)(5.8/2)(10')= 29.0"
3 (2') (11.25')
                                                                                           = 12.80
                +[-Mu-(80#/a,ft){(29 ")(1) (1.2'+(3)(5.8) +(27.5")(1') (8.3') +(22.5")(1')(1
                $\ \#\cu.ft.)\(2.5°)\(1')(3.5') +\(3.2°)\(1')(8.3) +\(2°)\(1')\(10.5')\+\(2.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(1')\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12.2°)\(12
                 (175#/a) (1/25") (1) (93) (125") - (125#a) (14) (1) (7")-(150#4) (1
                   (+ \(\SMu = (80 + \langle a.ft) (145 ft. + 228 ft. + 236 ft. +) + (150 + \a.ft) (44 ft
                           -27ft.4+21ft.4+146ft4)-45,754'#-12,250'#24,500'#
                 =48,720'#+35,700'#-82,504'#..........
                                                = 84,420'#- 82,504 = 1,916'# ...
                   F.S. = 84,420 1# = 1.02 - Safe Against over turning at dam bottom.
```

CLARENCE WELTI ASSOCIATES, INC.

100 SYCAMORE STREET . GLASTONBURY, CONN. 06033

(203) 633-4623

CLARENCE W. WELTI.

NOVEMBER 1, 1971

EDWARD J. Pi

TOWN OF MANCHESTER
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
MUNICIPAL BUILDING
MANCHESTER, CONN. 06040

ATT: MR. WALTER SENKOW

RE: UNION POND DAM

DEAR WALTER:

REGARDING THE ABOVE I HAVE REVIEWED YOUR ANALYSES RELATING TO OVERTURNING STABILITY AT 8' BELOW CREST AND 12' BELOW CREST. I HAVE ALSO VISITED THE DAM TO INSPECT SEEPAGE ON THE DOWNSTREAM SIDE AS WELL AS PORTIONS OF THE DAM ON THE DOWNSTREAM SIDE WHICH ARE BEING PREPARED FOR GROUTING.

AS PERTAINS TO THE STABILITY ANALYSES (OVERTURNING) THE APPROACH IS IN MY OPINION A CONSERVATIVE, RATIONAL APPROACH FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

- 1. WHILE PORTIONS OF THE DAM INDICATE UNCEMENTED STONES, THE LARGE PORTION OF DAM DOES NOT INDICATE THIS CONDITION-TWO DIMENSIONAL ANALYSES PRESUMES UNIFORM LONGITUDINAL CONDITIONS.
- 2. WHILE THE DAM WAS WITHIN TWO FEET OF THE CREST, I INSPECTED THE DOWNSTREAM FACE AND ALL POSSIBLE SEEPAGE AREAS WERE AT PRACTICALLY ZERO HEAD, INDICATING NO DRAINAGE PATHS WHEREIN PRESSURE WAS NOT DISSAPATED ON THE UPSTREAM SIDE OR WITHIN THE DAM.
- 3. THE FACE OF THE DAM, EXCLUDING THE AREAS PRESENTLY EXCAVATED, WAS AND IS QUITE EVEN; INDICATING NO FROST HEAVING. SUCH A PHENOMENON WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR IF SUBSTANTIAL WATER WAS SEEPING TO THE DOWN-STREAM SIDE OF THE DAM.

THE SAFETY FACTOR OF 1.03 TO 1.05 UNDER THE ABOVE CONDITIONS IS, IN MY OPINION, ADEQUATE; SINCE NOT ONLY IS BUOYANT WEIGHT BEING USED FOR THE ENTIRE CORE (EXCLUDING L' SHELL), BUT TRIANGULAR WATER (WITH FULL HEEL) PRESSURE IS BEING USED. THIS CONDITION IN REALITY ASSUMES ALMOST FULL WATER PRESSURE & ACROSS THE BASE OF THE SECTION OR NO WEIGHT OF THE WATER IN & THE VERTICAL DIRECTION DOWNWARD

REGARDING SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATIONS THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- 1. PLACE GUNITE OVER UPSTREAM SIDE TO ROCK WHERE POSSIBLE
- 2. WHERE NOT POSSIBLE CLAY BLANKET WILL BE PLACED. DEPTH AND DISTANCE WILL BE CALCULATED BY THE WRITER. THIS WOULD GREATLY DECREASE ANY PRESSURE HEAD AT SEEPAGE ZONE ON UPSTREAM SIDE.
- 3. INVESTIGATE WITH JACK HAMMER THE DEPTH TO SOUND CON-CRETE AT DOWNSTREAM FACE. PLACE #6 HOOKED BARS IN GROUT HOLES AT LEAST 3 FEET INTO "SOUND" CONCRETE ON 2 FEET CENTERS.
- 4. HANG GRID OF #5 BARS AT 8" X 8" ON ABOVE #6 BARS PRIOR TO GROUTING.
- 5. AT BASE OF DAM WHERE "OOZING" IS OCCURRING EXCAVATE WITH JACK HAMMER TO EXAMINE SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDATIONS.
- 6. AT 3 LOCATIONS IN DOWNSTREAM FACE PLACE DRAINS AS IN-DICATED ON THE ATTACHED. SINCE THESE AREAS WERE ONLY AREAS WHERE "BULGING" HAD OCCURRED IT IS PRESUMED THAT IF SEEPAGE OCCURS-ABOVE THE BASE-IT WILL OCCUR AT THESE AREAS.

WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLETED WORK ON ITEMS 2 & 5 PLEASE CALL ME.

VERY TRULY YOURS.


CLARENCE WELTI ASSOCIATES, INC.

BY;

CLARENCE WELTI, PH'D., P.E.

CWW:M CC:FILE

707



BY 1: DATE 11-85-71 SUBJECT Union Pond Dan SHEET NO. __ OF CHKO BY DATE Manchester Com. JOB NO. ______

Comments

- us 80 45/fts for core material is not true as "Buoyancy" was considered separately. A figure of 110 41/fts n 120 41/fts is more in order.
- under investigation. The real issue at the section is stress which is very low (+ 40 "/a" for bending and 20 "5/o" for shear).
- 3. If as assumed that the portion under investigation is an independent entity. The factor of safety against overturing shown in the computation is low. A factor of safety of 2.° is generally regid.
- (4) If the concrete of the section under consideration broken:

Total Sliding Force =0.125 x 12 + 2.0.75 x 12 = 6.0 K

 $Wf. of the Dlass = (A_1 + A_2 + A_3) * 0.11 + (A_4 + A_5 + A_6 + A_7) \cdot 0.15$ $- - 0.024 (A_1 + A_2 + A_3 + A_4 + A_5 + A_6 + A_7)$

 $= 8.7 + 4.4 - 6.8^{K} = 6.3^{K}$

With Friction factor say o.6

.. N.f = 06x63 = 38 x < 6.0 x

Conclusion: If the concrete & the section under considera; broken, the portion of the structure above that section is likely to be washed away.

7.35 101 Sa ARFA -A = 54.2 58 mi 7.35 MI MESTS = 54.2 ×660: 3480 LENGTH OF TRAVEL 735 x 1.41 = 10,4 mi POND EL. 140-00 x 5,250' = \$4,000 600 HT 600' FIT HICEST POINT 454 7 SCOPE 500' = .00925 % SAY .01% CN 80 LAG GHOURS TC = 1.67 L = 167 X 6 = 10 HRS SHIM S. = i getnetre G: CAA Q: .4x.5 x 3,480 = 695 c.f.S. - 100% RUNDIF Q = 10x .5 x 3,480 = 1740 C.F.S.

CHECK CAPACITY OF SPILLWAY WITH 1' FOOT HEAD L= 300' Q= 3.33 L H3/2 Q= 3.33 × 300 × 1/2 × 122 Q = 1,000 × 1 Q = 1,000 cfs. CAPACITY WITH Z' HEAD Q = 3.33 x 300 x 2/2 x 242 >1/2. 0 = 1,000 x 2/2 = 1,000 x 2,82 Q = 2,820 c.f.s. > 1740 c.f.s. 100 YEAR STORM CAPCITY WITH 3 HEAD = SZOOCES C FAIT HART. HOCK ANUM RIVER 1,000 C.f.S. MEAN ANNUL FLOW -795 SQ MI DRAINAGE EFFECTIVE 57.5 SOMI for 100 YEAR STORM RATIO FACTOR = Q = 1000 cfs y


E

	WATERCHED AREA		200 11/1
	A-1 (2 x 1.5	-	۰٦٤ ٫
	A·2 3.75 × 425	;	16.00
	A-3 12 x 2 x 4.25	=	4.25
	A-4 1/2 x 175 x 1.25		1.10
[A-5 175 x 5.5	*	9,60
	N-6 2.5 + 30	•	7.50
	A.7 3.0 x 225	£	675
1	A-8 1.75 × 1.25	• •	7. 20
	A-9 % x 30 x 30	=	4.50
(r	0.5 × 2.1 x 3/1 01-A	7	1.50
			54.15 Sa MI

1 P = AWA P = 10' x 1 x 62.4 x 9 = 5, C/6 # SAY 5,700# | CENTER OF PRISSURE 1 CP: $\frac{1}{900} + 900 = \frac{1 \times 10^{3}}{9 \times 10} + 9 = \frac{23.5}{90} + 9 = \frac{9.7}{90}$ SAY 10' h = 9' C 5,700# m'= c, x 10, x 120 x/d #000,P = Wz = 1/2 x10 x4 x150 **±000**ξ = CHECK ONER TOWARD C //

e: 6-500-100 11500 7 Piso ec to m Lansion me dowel regit. 154.

R-14




RESULTANT OF VERT

27/3

(12,000")(x) = 4,000 x 3 + 3,000 x 7/3'

000,55 + 000,75 = (x) (000,51)

x = 49,000 = 4.08



MID: 10 = 1.67

CHECK RESULTANT IN MIDDLE 3RD

 $e = EM/v = \frac{5,700 \times 4}{12,000} = \frac{5,700}{3,000} = 1.93$

e 7 13/6

1.93 7 1.67 TENSION ON CONC

CHECK STRESS

$$f_{\text{LUM}} = \frac{EV}{BL} \left(1 + \frac{6s}{C} \right) = \frac{15,000 \pm (1 + \frac{6 \times 1.93'}{10'})}{10' \times 1}$$

B-35

= 1200 (1± 1.16)

f comp : 1200 psf x 2.16 = 2700 psf. x /p4: 188 ps1

FTEN = 1200 PSF x -. 16 = 192 PSF. (133 PSI

1.33 PJI

F PII T

agegrania and the enter of

CHECK #8 BAR AT 20'


MOM PER FT = 5,700 ×4 = 22,800 FT-#

Moni priz 20' = 22.81k x 20' = 456 1K

FORCE ON BAR = 450 = 910 K

BAR RESISTS .79 \$" x 20.06/12 = 15.8 16 N.G. 78 @ 20' N.G.

BETTER LOCATION



As = 144 rd = 22.8 " 1.44 × 108"

As= .147 \$11 #8 As = ,79 4"

SIACING = .79 4" = 5.4"

SAY @ 5-0' 0.0

PENEIRYN P. O. BOX 146 EVERETT, MASSACHUSETTS 02149 617-389-1525 If entire upstream face carnot be encased bring the Gunte down to SECTION A.A A below move and ice line. hiave and he line DOWNSTREAM CO. Abutment Drill hole for growing leaking seams in rock. CE FAIT Y JE TO BOOK Spillway Detail D Drilled hole intersects leaking crack for sealing it with growt. Gunite 7 Leaking crack + SECTION 8-8 Leaks on face of Dam which cannot be grouted are drained to bottom of spillway. Abulment /C Gunite-Minimum -One half clay tike DETAIL D Micemon 2 SECTION C-C
All areas not chipped to be sendblested before qunite is applied. 2x2-4/2x 12 Galvanized we wire fabric. 3x3-4/014 Ax4-8868 may be substit Hooked expansion bolls 30 O.C. each way. Use one layer of m. Sab for each 3° thick .. ss. Chip out deteriorates T Gunite-Minimum

74 16

MATT AR REEL

July 21, 1972

Jose M. Cosio
Chief Engineer
44 Gillett Street
Martford, Connecticut 06105
Macchie - Hoffman Ingineering

Subject: Union Fond Dam - Clay Blanket

Dear Br. Cosio:

As you requested after visiting the construction site, I as submitting a planned sketch of the clay blanket limit behind the dam. Also shown on this sketch is the de th of the clay blanket at the location. As you may recall the depth of the clay is greater than the hole that was dug. I am doing this as you requested at the site and in your letter of July 12.


As a matter of general information I would like to cention that the controlled sluize gates have been built, mounted and are in operation. A wall has been built around the waste water gate. With this information I hope in your judgment, that you will recommend that the Department of Environmental Protection issue the Town of Canchester a certificate of approval.

If, however, in your opinion, there are other matters to be resolved, please let me know and I will do wh tever I can.

Yours truly,

Malter J. Senkow Town Engineer

VJS/dc cc: Villiam H. O'Brien III Villiam D. O'Neill Robert Weiss 38



MACCHI & NOFFMAN ENGINEER

EXECUTIVE OFFICES HARTFORD, CONN., 06105

A. J. MACCHI, P.E. H. R. HOFFMAN, P.E. MICHAEL GIRARD

ASSOCIATE CONSULTANT PROF. C. W. DUNHAM

August 7, 1972

Dept. of Environmental Protection Water & Related Resources 165 Capitol Avenue Hartford, Connecticut

Attention Mr. William H. O'Brien III

Re: Union Pond Dam Conditional Approval Recommended Supersedes Our Letter 7/24/72

Gentlemen:

FILED ---

We have received the plan showing the extent of the clay blanket placed behind the recently repaired Union Pond dam, from the Town of Manchester.

As the clay blanket placed behind the dam is used to seal the upstream face of the dam itself, the extent of the blanket away from the dam is not critical due to the fact that the dam rests on a rock foundation, as indicated on the drawings.

Due to limitations in being able to verify the actual results obtained by grouting and actual condition of the original portion of this dam, it is recommended that conditional approval be granted at this time, to fill the reservoir behind the dam and after approximately six months, a reinspection be made to verify leakage through the dam.

	very crury yours,
WATER & RELATED RESOURCES RECEIVED	MACCHI & HOFEMAN, ENGINEERS
(.06 ÷ 1972	A. J. MAGCHI
ANSV/E	•
REPERRED	

APPENDIX

SECTION C: DETAIL PHOTOGRAPHS




PHOTO NO.1 - General view of downstream face of left spillway section and natural bedrock foundation.



PHOTO NO.2 - Downstream view of sluice gate outlets and gatehouse.

US ARMY ENGINEER DIV. NEW ENGLAND CORPS OF ENGINEERS WALTHAM, MASS.

CAHN ENGINEERS INC. WALLINGFORD, CONN. ARCHITECT--- ENGINEER NATIONAL PROGRAM OF INSPECTION OF NON-FED. DAMS Union Pond Dam
Hockanum River
Manchester, Connecticut
CE# 27 595
DATE Feb 1979 PAGE C-1




PHOTO NO.3 - General view of downstream face of right spillway section, right abutment, and low level waste gate outlet.



PHOTO NO.4 - Close-up of seepage and weepholes in downstream face of spillway.

US ARMY ENGINEER DIV. NEW ENGLAND CORPS OF ENGINEERS WALTHAM, MASS.

CAHN ENGINEERS INC. WALLINGFORD, CONN. ARCHITECT — ENGINEER NATIONAL PROGRAM OF INSPECTION OF NON-FED. DAMS Union Pond Dam
Hockanum River
Manchester, Connecticut
CE# 27 595
DATE Feb 1979 PAGE C-2



PHOTO NO.7 - View of damaged gatehouse and bent, corroded trash racks.



PHOTO NO.8 - Upstream view of two (2) sluice gates. Only one is operable and open at time of inspection.

US ARMY ENGINEER DIV. NEW ENGLAND CORPS OF ENGINEERS WALTHAM, MASS.

CAHN ENGINEERS INC. WALLINGFORD, CONN. ARCHITECT- ENGINEER NATIONAL PROGRAM OF INSPECTION OF NON-FED. DAMS Union Pond Dam

Hockanum River

Manchester, Connecticut

CE # 27 595

DATE Feb 1979 PAGE C-4




PHOTO NO.5 - Close-up of void in left spillway section downstream face. Note deteriorated gunnite facing.




PHOTO NO.6 - Close-up of pressure relief weep hole drilled in downstream face of spillway.

US ARMY ENGINEER DIV. NEW ENGLAND CORPS OF ENGINEERS WALTHAM, MASS.

> CAHN ENGINEERS INC. WALLINGFORD, CONN ARCHITECT --- ENGINEER

NATIONAL PROGRAM OF INSPECTION OF

NON-FED. DAMS

Union Pond Dam Hockanum River

Manchester, Connecticut

CE# 27 595

DATEFeb 1979 PAGE C-3

APPENDIX

SECTION D: HYDRAULIC/HYDROLOGIC COMPUTATIONS

PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE

FOR ESTIMATING

MAXIMUM PROBABLE DISCHARGES

IN

PHASE I DAM SAFETY

INVESTIGATIONS

New England Division Corps of Engineers


March 1978


MAXIMUM PROBABLE GOOD INFLOWS NED RESERVOIRS


	Project	(cfs)	(sq. mi.)	MPF cfs/sq. mi.
1.	Hall Meadow Brook	26,600	17.2	1,546
2.	East Branch	15,500	9.25	1,675
3.	Thomaston	158,000	97.2	1,625
4.	Northfield Brook	9,000	5.7	1,580
5.	Black Rock	35,000	20.4	1,715
6.	Hancock Brook	20,700	12.0	1,725
7.	Hop Brook	26,400	16.4	1,610
8.	Tully	47,000	50.0	940
9.	Barre Falls	61,000	55.0	1,109
10.	Conant Brook	11,900	7.8	1,525
11.		160,000	162.0	987
12.		98,000	52.3	1,870
	Colebrook River	165,000	118.0	1,400
	Mad River	30,000	18.2	1,650
15.	Sucker Brook	6,500	3.43	1,895
16.		110,000	126.0	873
17.		199,000	220.0	904
18.		157,000	158.0	994
19.		190,000	172.0	1,105
20.	Townshend	228,000	106.0(278 tota	1) 820
21.		63,000	100.0	630
22.		45,000	47.0	957
23.		88,500	175.0	5 05
24.		73,900	67.5	1,095
25.	Westville	38,400	99.5(32 net)	1,200
26.	West Thompson	85,000	173.5(74 net)	1,150
27.		35,600	31.1	1,145
28.		36,500	26.5	1,377
29.		125,000	159.0	786
30.	West Hill	26,000	28.0	928
31.		210,000	1000.0	210
32.		66,500	128.0	520
33.	•	135,000	426.0	316
34.	Everett	68,000	64.0	1,062
35.	MacDowell	36,300	44.0	825

MAXIMUM PROBABLE FLOWS BASED ON TWICE THE STANDARD PROJECT FLO(D) (Flat and Coastal Areas)

	River	SPF (cfs)	D.A. (sq. m1.)	(cfs/sq. mi.)
1.	Pawtuxet River	19,000	200	190
2.	Mill River (R.I.)	8,500	34	500
3.	Peters River (R.I.)	3,200	13	490
4.	Kettle Brook	8,000	30	530
5.	Sudbury River.	11,700	86	270
6.	Indian Brook (Hopk.)	1,000	5.9	340
7.	Charles River.	6,000	184	65
8.	Blackstone River.	43,000	416	200
9.	Quinebaug River	55,000	331	330








MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL PROFESSION STANCARCY (1984)

ON MAXIMUM PROBABLE DISCHARGES



STEP 1: Determine Peak Inflow (Qp1) from Guide Curves.

STEP 2: a. Determine Surcharge Height To Pass "Qp1".

b. Determine Volume of Surcharge (STOR1) In Inches of Runoff.


c. Maximum Probable Flood Runoff In New England equals Approx. 19", Therefore

$$Qp2 = Qp1 \times (1 - \frac{STOR1}{19})$$

STEP 3: a. Determine Surcharge Height and "STOR2" To Pass "Qp2"

b. Average "STOR1" and "STOR2" and Determine Average Surcharge and Resulting Peak Outflow "Qp3".

"RULE OF THUMB" GUIDANCE FOR ESTIMATING DOWNSTREAM DAM FAILURE HYDROGRAPHS



STEP 1: DETERMINE OR ESTIMATE RESERVOIR STORAGE (S) IN AC-FT AT TIME OF FAILURE.

STEP 2: DETERMINE PEAK FAILURE OUTFLOW (Qp1).

$$Qp_1 = \frac{8}{27} W_b \sqrt{g} Y_0^{\frac{3}{2}}$$

W_b= BREACH WIDTH - SUGGEST VALUE NOT GREATER THAN 40% OF DAM LENGTH ACROSS RIVER AT MID HEIGHT.

Yo = TOTAL HEIGHT FROM RIVER BED TO POOL LEVEL AT FAILURE.

STEP 3: USING USGS TOPO OR OTHER DATA, DEVELOP REPRESENTATIVE STAGE-DISCHARGE RATING FOR SELECTED DOWNSTREAM RIVER REACH.

STEP 4: ESTIMATE REACH OUTFLOW (Q_{p2}) USING FOLLOWING ITERATION.

A. APPLY Q_{p1} TO STAGE RATING, DETERMINE STAGE AND ACCOPMANYING VOLUME (V_1) IN REACH IN AC-FT. (NOTE: IF V_1 EXCEEDS 1/2 OF S, SELECT SHORTER REACH.)

B. DETERMINE TRIAL Qp2.

 $Qp_2(TRIAL) = Qp_1(1-\frac{V_1}{5})$

c. COMPUTE v_2 USING Q_{p2} (TRIAL).

D. AVERAGE V_1 AND V_2 AND COMPUTE Q_{p2} .

 $Qp_2 = Qp_1 \left(1 - \frac{V_{\text{mod}}}{S}\right)$

STEP 5: FOR SUCCEEDING REACHES REPEAT STEPS 3 AND 4.

APRIL 1978

Cahn Engineers Inc. Consulting Engineers Project INSPECTION OF NON-FEUTINE DELL IN HELD ENSCALE Sheet _____ of ______ Date 1/22/79 Computed By Help Cnecked By CKA Other Refs. CE#27-578-KA Field Book Ref.____ HYDROLDGIE! HYDRAGER INSPECTION UNION POND DAN, MANCHESTER, CT. I) PERFORMANCE AT TEST FLOOD CONDITIONS: 1) MAKIMUM PROBACKÉ FROD: a) WATERSINED CLASSIFIED AS "ROLLING" 6) WATERSHED AREA . DA = 53.9 SQ MI (USGS HARTFORD OFFICE) C) FROM NED-ACE "PRECIMINARY GUIDANCE FOR GITIMITING MAC. PROBABLE DISCHARGES " - GUIVE CULVE FUR PHT - PEAR FORD RAIE! PMF= 1150 Chasson d) PEAK INFLOW: PMF = 1450 x 53.9 3 62000 CFS 2) SPILLINAY DESIGN FLOOD (SOF): a) CLASSIFICATION OF DAY ACCORDING TO NEO-ACE RECOMMENDED GUIDE CINES. i) SIZE : STORAGE (MAX) \$ 720 AC-PT (50 & S & 1000 MET) HEIGHT = 33' (25 5 H 5 40 FT)

*STORAGE: TWOM U.S. INVENTORY OF DAMS DATED 11/26/73; STORAGE AT TROWLINE: 515 ALL AT MAR. FOOL 565 ACFT; HOWEVER C.E. HOUGH CHECK BASED ON LAKE AREA FROM CONN.

DEP, WATER & RELATED RESONACES INVENTORY SHEET OF A-515 AC. AND SPICIOUP CREST TO TO PP DAM DEPTH DE A' (A.G. RISE ENGRS, WORDESTER, MASS.): SHAPE 515 + 4 x 51.5 = 726

HEIGHT: ESTIMATED TROOM A.C.RIS: "NGRS. DRAWING NO 1401-C GATE HOUSE OND DAM

DATED JULY 27,1901.

Consulting Engineers

Project NON-FEVERAC DAM	es In de Man!	Sneet 2 of //
	Checked By CFC	Date 1/22/29
Field Book Ref	Other Refs CE#27-595- K4	Revisions

UNION PONO JAM

2, a - Contid) CLASSIFICATION

CE) HAZARD POTENTIAC: THE DAM IS LOCATED US OF URBANIZED PORTION OF MANCHESTER, CT. - SOME LOW GROUND HOUSES, IS NOUSTRIAL BUTCHES.

SEE LOCATED NEAR ADAMS ST. (+) 1.5 MILES DIS PETENDINS ON THE MASNITUDE OF A POSSIBLE FLOOD WADE, OTHER STRUCTURES, CLUSU, TO THE DAM MAY ALSO BE AFFECTED.

Ui) CLASSIFICATION:

SIZE: SMACC

HAZARD: HIGH

b) SDF = PMF = 62000 CFS

1/2 FAF = 31000 CFS

3) SURCHARGE AT PEAK INFLOWS:

a) PEAN INFLOW: Sip = 62000 CFS Qp = 1 PMP = 3/000 CFS

b) SPICLWAY (ONTELOW) RATING CURVE

i) SPILLWAY.



THE SPILLWAY IS CLASSIFIED AS A BRUAD CRESTED COMPOUND WEIR OF TRAPS ZOLDAL CRUSS SECTION WITH ENCLINED FACES. THE US. FACE ON "O" 6" TO 1" SLOPE AND THE "YS FACE AT 30" WITH THE VERTICAL ((2)1" TO 1.75") (A.C. RISE, ENGINEER, WORKESTER, MASI. DWG Nº 1401-C "GRTE HOUSE AND DAY SOR CHENEY BROK." DATED JUL. 27, 1901). IN PLAN. THE STYLLMAY IS "L" SHAPED; ONE LEG ARCHED(2)104" (A.C.REE DW. ADSUSTED

Consulting Engineers

Project NON-FEUERAC DAWS INSKESSIONS		Sheet = of //
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Field Book Ref	Other Refs CE # 27-515-K4	Revisions

UNION POND DAY

3,6-Contd) OUTFLOW KATING CURVE

ROUGHLY TO ACTUAL LENGTH BY C.E. FIELD OBSELVATIONS) AND THE OTHER, STUDIES. (±)194' LONG. THEREFORE, THE TOTAL SPILLWAY CREST IS (±) 300' LONG.
THE HEIGHT BETWEEN THE SPILLWAY CREST (ELEV. 142.7' MS.) AND THE TOP OF THE DAM (ELEV. 146.7' MSL) IS H=4! THE US-VERTICAL DEPTH OF THE SPILLWAY FACE IS P=8'

: SPILLWAY DISCHARGE COEFFICIENT, ASSUME: C=3.5

USING THE CREST ELEVATION AS DATUM (ELEV. 1827'436), THE SMLLOW DISCHARGE IS APPROXIMATED BY:

95=1050 H3/2

(i) EXTENSION OF RATING CLIEVE FOR SURCHANGE HEADS ABOVE TOP OF DAM.

BESIDES THE CONCRETE ABUTHENTS AT BOTH SIDES OF THE SHILLING,
TO THE RIGHT SIDE BANK AND TO THE GATE HOUSE AT THE LEFT,
THE DAM EXTENDS AS AN EARTH DIKE, TO THE LEFT BETWEEN
THE GATE HOUSE AND THE LEFT SIDE BANK. THE DIKE WRAK BENNU
THE GATE HOUSE TO TIE WITH THE SPINUMY LEFT ABUTHENT
THE TOP ELEV. OF THE DIKE WILL BE ASSUMED THE SAME ELFY. 146.7'MC
OF THE SPALWAY ACUTHENTS IN THESE COMPUTATIONS. (DIKE LOW)
POINTS ASSUMED REPAIRED TO CORRECT ELEV.)

THE SPILLWAY RIGHT ABUTHENT IS (\$6' WIDE x 37' LONG; THE LEFT ABUTHENT IS (\$) 6' WIDE x 20' LONG. THE EARTH DIKE IS \$ 10' WIDE **NOTE: A.C. RISE MAP ELEVS. TRANSFERED TO MSC MITTIN BY C.E. SULVEY FROM CITY OF MANCHEITER, DEPT. OF TRINSPORTATION, BM. AT TRANSFORMER AND TO THE LEFT OF THE RESERVOIR (SEE C.E. DW4S)

Consulting Engineers

Hect NON-FEDERAL DAMES	- INSPECTION)	Sheet
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UNION FOND DAM

- F

3, 6- Conta) OUTFLOW KATING CURRE

AT THE TOP AND 1.5 " TO 1" SIDE SLOPES AND IS (#) 180' LONG.

THE TEURNIN BEYOND THE RIGHT SLOE ABUTHENT BASES (±) IN A 3H TO I'S CUPE TO (±) 14' ABOVE THE DAM. THE TEURAIN AT THE LEFT OF THE DIKE RISES GRADUALLY (±) 24' IN A DISTANCE OF (±) 900'.

ASSUME C= 3.0 FOR THE ABUTMENTS AND DIKE AND

C= 2.5 FOR THE OVERFLOW AT THE SIDES OF THE DAW.

ASSUME ALSO, EQUIVALENT LENGTHS FOR THE TELRAIN AT THE SIDES OF THE DAM AS FOLLOWS:

$$L_{R}^{\prime} = \frac{2}{3} \left(\frac{3}{7}\right) (H-4) = 2(H-4)$$

$$L'_{L} = \frac{2}{3} \left(\frac{700}{24} \right) (H-4) = 24 (H-4)$$

THE TOTAL OUTFLOW RATING CURVE CAN BE APPROXIMATED BY:

THE OUTFLOW RATING CURVE IS PLOTTED ON NEXT PAGE.

C) SPILLWAY CAPACITY TO TOP OF DAM:

Consulting Engineers

Project NON FEDERAL DAMS - INSPECTION computed By omputed By HU Checked By CR,
eld Book Ref Other Refs. CE#27-595-K4 Q=1050 H34+710 (H-4)32+65 (H-4)5/2 30 40 DISCHARGE -(1000 CFS) 3-Contd) OUTFLOW RATING CURVE Depth above spillimay crest (ft) W. S. ELEVA 'ON - (FT - MSL)

Cahn Engineers Inc. Consulting Engineers

		S-INSPECTION	Sheet 6 of //
•	1	Checked By <u>CRA</u> Other Refs <u>CE # 27-575</u>	
16.0 000	•		
	UNION POND	DAM	
	3-Conta) Sue	CHARGE AT PEAK INFLOA	US
Ç	d) SURCH	ANGE HEIGHT TO PASS Q	ę;
	i) @ 0	PP, = FMF = 62000 CES	H= 11.2'
	ii) @ a	8p = 1 PMF = 31000 CFS	H, = 7.9'
(4) EFFECT OF		W MAN. PROBABLE DISCHARGES
1	a) Resi	EKVOIK (POND) AREA C	FLOW LINE: A=51.5 AC.
[TRORESOURCES - JANENTOLY SHEET.
F	C.E.	, CHECK MEASURE (USGS, 1:2000C) A=SI.4 AC CONTOUR 4'ABOVENC A=71"
- !	i. A60	UME AVE. LAKE ÅREA NITUM O	Expecto Surcharge, A=60 K
1	b) Assum	IE NOWNAL FOOL LEVEL PT	SPILLWAY CREST (ELEV. 142.7 MSL)
Ł	C) WATER	SHED AREA: D.A - 53.7 54	1.Mi (SEE P.1)
	d) Discu	UNGE GO AT VARIOUS SURCE	MAIGE ELEVATIONS

H=12' V=60x12=720 AC-FT S= 720 = 0.25"

H=5' Y=300 ACFT . S=0.10"

. FROM APPROXIMATE STORAGE RONTING NED-ACE GODELINES (19" MAX. PROBABLE R.O. IN NEW ENGLAND):

Consulting Engineers

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UNION POND DAM

4, d. Cont'd) DISCHARGE (Lip) AT VARIOUS SURCHARGE ZIEVE.

ON = ON (1-5) AND FOR 1/2 PMF: OF = OP (1-5)

. FOR:

H=12' 42 = 61200 CFS

9/2 30200 CES

4=5' Q1 = 617004 Q1 = 30700CF.

e) PEAK OUTFLOW (OF.)

USING NED ACE GUIDELINES "SURCHARIE STURGE KOUTING ALTERNATE " METHOD (SEE P.S)

Op = 61200 CFC H3 = 11.1' FOR Op - PMF

G' 30500 CFS H' 7.9' FOR G' = 1 PMF

f) SPILLWAY CAPACITY KATIO TO OUTELOW:

SPICLWAY CAPACITY TO TOP OF DAM: QS = 8400 CFS

: SPICLWAY CAPACAY IS (3) 14% THE ONTFLOW @ PAF AND (1) 28% THE OUTPLOW @ 12 PAF.

5) SUMMARY:

a) PEAK INFLOW BP, = PMF = 62000 CFS G'A = 1/2 PMF = 31000 CFS

b) PEAK OUTFLAN BY = 61200 OF Q1 = 30500 COS

C) SPILLWY MAX, CAPACITY: Q: 8400CFS OR 14% of Q, AND 28% OF Q'S THEREFORE, AT SOF = 1/2 PMF, THE DAM IS OVERTOPISO (2) 3.9' (WS.E. 150.6) OR, TO

AN AVE. SURCHARGE ABOVE THE STILL WAY CREST OF (2)7.9'

Cahn Engineers Inc. Consulting Engineers

NON	FEVERIC DAME - INSPECTION	Sheet 8 of // Date 1/24/74
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	and the same of the	T
•	UNION POND DAM	
<u>E</u>	II) DOWNSTREAM TAILURE HAKAKD	
	1) PEAK TOOD AND STAGE JUNEOMITELY % FRE	OU DAN.
	a) BREACH WIUTH:	
1		7 - 33 = 130,2 SA4, 1 30 'M EL)
,	. (i) APPROX. MID. HEIGHT LENGTH &= 310' (FROM SEE)	A.C. KICE DUG L C.E. AUTUUMIT B. 3, 6, 6 pp. 2-3)
	: iii) BRENCH WIDTH (SEE NED-ACE DIS DAY FA	
	W= 0.4×310 = 124' Assure W	=/20'
	b) PEAK FAILURE ONTFLOW (OR)	
ľ.	ASSUME SURCHARGE TO TOP OF DOM;	THEATFURE,
[-	() NEIGHT AT TIME OF FAILURE: Yo = 33'	·
	U) SPILLWAP DISCHARGE: Q= 8400 - 3 NOTE: THE DAM IS MOSTLY SPILLWAY AM	1400 = 5000 ^{CFS} ID THEREFORE, THE SPILLWAY FLAW
<i>(</i> 1	HAS BEEN LEDUCED BY THE FLOW) OF	VEN THE PORTION OF BREACHED
	SPILL WAY (L= 120').	
	UI) BREACH OUTFLOW (O):	
1	Q6 = 8 W, V3 4 3 = 38200 SFS	
1	W) PEAK FAILURE ONTFLOW (OR): Gp = 0 G	0 = 41600 CAS D-14

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Project NON FEVERIAL DA	MANY - TINEPE THIS	Sheet <u> </u>
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UNION FUND DAM

1- (mid) YEAR FLLOD AND STAGE JUNEOUSTELY DE FLORIDAGE.

C) FLOOD WAVE HELSAT TAMEDIATELY IS OF DAM:

Yão.4440 2 15'


2) ESTIMATE OF DE DAM FAILURE CONDITION AT JUVACT AREA.

(SEE NEW-ACE GUIDELINES FOR ESTIMATING PS DAMFAILUEE HYUROGRAPHS).

ASSUME RESERVOIR FULL TO TOP OF DAM AT THE OF FAILURE.

- a) RESERVOIR STORAGE AT TIME OF FAILURE: 5= 720 KFT (SEP.1)
- b) TYPICAL PLS CROSS SECTION & RATING CURVES.

(FROM USGS. MANCHESTER, CT. BUNDEAUGH SHEET, PHOTOREVISED MIS, SCALE 1:2000)



ASSUME: () n = 0.050

ii) SLOPE: 5. = 0.42% (DEOPS 30' IN (=) 7200')

-1/2 = 0.065


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Toject NON FEDERA: DAMS - INSPECTION		Sheet 10 of 11
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UNION POND DAM

2-Cont'd) % CLOSS SECTION - RATING CURVES

C) KATING CURVES



d) REACH OUTFLOW (GB)

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roject NON-FEDERAL DARY JNSPECTICAL Sheet // of // Date 1/25/77 Computed By 4/12 _____ Checked By <u>CR6</u> Other Refs. CE #27-595-KA ield Book Ref ___

UNION POND DAM

Z, d- Conti) REACH SUPPLIED (Sp.)

U)(Qp), = Qp (1-V1) = 20500 CFS : (42), = 16.3' (V2) = 214 xc +1

UI) AVE NOLUME IN REACH NO. 1: (VAIC), = 287 AC FT

Vil) REACH Not OUTFLOW (OR), = 25000 (43), = 17.5'

VIII) ASSUME LENGTH OF REACH NO. 2 Lz = 4500'

(x) (ap,) = 25000 CFS (4,) = 17.5' (V,) = 316 MEFT < 5 61

x) (QB) = 14000 CFS (42) = 14.1' (V2) = 205 ACFT

XI) AVE VOLUME IN REACH NO. 2: (YADE) = 260 AC FT

XÜ) REACH No. 2 OUTFLOW: (AB) = 16000 CFS (43) = 14.8; SAY, 15'

3) SUMMARY

a) PEAK FAILURE OUTFAUN: Q7 = 41600 CFS

b) REACH OUT FLOW (IMPACT ARCA) Q = 16000 CFS

C) AVE. WATER DEPTH (STAGE) Y = 15' (AT THEACT AREA)

APPENDIX

SECTION E: INVENTORY OF DAMS IN UNITED STATES